

# Dissecting Corporate Culture Using Generative AI

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We conduct the first large-scale study of how different stakeholder groups assess corporate culture and quantify the economic implications of those differences. We employ generative AI to analyze analyst reports, call transcripts, and employee reviews, and organize the

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extracted information into a knowledge graph that links a culture type to its perceived causes and effects. We demonstrate that the divergence in different stakeholder groups' assessment of culture aligns with their distinct roles and economic incentives. Moreover, we show that analysts' culture analyses are incorporated into stock recommendations and target prices, and investors react to divergence in stakeholders' assessment of culture. (*JEL* C45, C55, G32, G34, Z1)

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Corporate culture is “a set of norms and values that are widely shared and strongly held throughout the organization” (O'Reilly and Chatman 1996). Since “the ‘cultural revolution’ in finance” began a decade ago (Zingales 2015), researchers have gained a deeper understanding of corporate culture, gleaned from values presented on corporate websites as well as through surveys and interviews with corporate executives, earnings conference calls, employee reviews, and job postings (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015; Grennan 2019; Li, Mai, Shen, and Yan 2021; Graham, Grennan, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2022a, 2022b; Huang, Pacelli, Shi, and Zou 2024; Li, Chen, and Shen 2024, Li et al. 2025; also see surveys by Gorton, Grennan, and Zentefis 2022; Grennan and Li 2023). However, this body of work leaves a number of important questions unexplored: (1) Which cultural values are important to different stakeholders in a modern corporation? (2) How does corporate culture matter according to different stakeholders? (3) What explains the divergence in perspectives among different stakeholders? (4) What is the relationship between corporate culture and price formation? Our study is among the first in finance, accounting, and economics to apply generative AI models as reasoning agents on analyst reports, earnings call transcripts, and employee reviews to address these questions.

Answering these questions using three large and very different textual data sets presents significant challenges. To overcome those challenges, we introduce a new information-extraction method that applies generative AI models, such as OpenAI's GPT, to automatically analyze and extract cause–effect relations pertaining to corporate culture from a corpus and to determine the tone of that discussion. To illustrate, in the report featuring Macy's Inc. by Matthew R. Boss from JP Morgan, released on March 12, 2012, the analyst says, “...With the turn in the selling culture taking place just last summer (according to CEO Lundgren) and with gross margin drivers on the horizon (Omnichannel and price optimization) we see double digit earnings growth through 2015.” Our method extracts a cause–effect relationship in a triple as (“focused selling culture,” “results in,” “double digit earnings growth through

2015") with a positive tone. These relationships reflect the reasoning processes analysts undertake to connect different culture types (e.g., customer-oriented) to their perceived causes and effects (e.g., market share and growth).

To provide a bird's-eye view of corporate culture from analysts' perspectives, we first normalize the extracted relationships into six culture types, eighteen causes, and seventeen business outcomes; we then aggregate them into a cause–effect knowledge graph. The graph shows that, according to equity analysts, the top two culture types most relevant for valuation are (1) innovation and adaptability and (2) collaboration and people-focused. Our method further allows us to pinpoint the events, people, or systems that shape specific culture types and identify which culture type has the most impact in driving specific business outcomes. For example, analysts view management teams (people) and employee hiring and retention (a system) as the top two factors shaping a collaboration and people-focused culture. That culture bolsters market share and growth and drives employee satisfaction.

How do analysts' perspectives on corporate culture compare with those of management and employees? We adapt the same generative AI model to the earnings call and employee review data sets and make the following observations. Analysts and management generally agree on the importance of different culture types. However, the frequency with which analysts discuss the integrity and risk management culture is markedly higher compared to those of management and employees, a variation that aligns with analysts' monitoring roles. Moreover, discussions of the collaboration and people-focused culture dominate in employee reviews on Glassdoor. This dominance likely reflects employees' natural focus on their day-to-day experiences of organizational culture and how that culture affects them personally. Moreover, both analysts and management believe business strategy is the most important driver for cultural changes, whereas employees view management teams as primarily responsible for cultural changes. In terms of a culture's effects, both analysts and management believe market share and growth is the number one outcome of firms with a strong culture, whereas employees view their own satisfaction as the most important outcome. These systematic differences align with the distinct roles and different incentives of each stakeholder group.

We validate our corporate culture measures extracted from analyst reports using well-established markers for best business practices, corporate innovation, integrity, and customer satisfaction and show that our extracted measures are positively and significantly associated with those markers. We also run a horse race using the respective tones of analysts, management, and employees in discussing culture to predict future firm performance and find that only analysts' tones can consistently predict future performance. Moreover, we show that analysts' insights into culture and M&As predict price reactions to deal announcements.

To gain a better understanding of why analysts are interested in corporate culture, we employ regression analyses, relating firm and analyst characteristics to the likelihood of analysts featuring culture discussions in their reports and, when they do so, the specific culture type they discuss. In terms of analyst characteristics, we show that analysts who are women, highly ranked, more experienced, who hold Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) charters, have master's degrees, and make frequent forecasts are more likely to discuss culture in their reports.

We next explore the determinants of the divergence between different stakeholder groups' perspectives on culture. Given the multidimensional output generated from our information-extraction method—culture types, causes, effects, and tones—we employ two sets of measures to capture the degree of divergence in perspectives. Our first set is the Euclidean distance measures, which quantify the overall differences in how analysts and management (employees) discuss culture. Our second set is the difference in frequency between analysts and management (employees) in discussing a specific culture type. We show that firm size and the number of meetings between analysts and firms are negatively and significantly associated with the divergence between analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on culture constructs, whereas volatile operating performance is positively and significantly associated with the divergence in views. The first result suggests that there is less disagreement in analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on culture in more transparent firms. The second result suggests that there is more divergence in analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on culture in firms facing great uncertainty. We note that both firm (e.g., firm size) and governance characteristics (e.g., board independence) are correlated with the degree of divergence between analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on culture.

Finally, we explore whether there is any relationship between corporate culture and price formation. We find that analysts' positive tones in discussing culture are positively and significantly associated with their stock recommendations and target prices, controlling for their tones in sections of their reports that do not discuss culture. In terms of economic significance, a change in tone from neutral to positive is associated with a 12.7 percentage point increase in the probability of analysts upgrading their recommendations and a 2.0 percentage point increase in target price forecast relative to the mean. Moreover, this effect is further substantiated if the report contains a culture-related cause (effect) analysis. Importantly, we find that analysts' positive tone on culture triggers a significant market reaction under only two conditions: when an analyst's report provides deeper causal analysis than those of her peers (ie, by offering more identified causes and effects), or when an analyst's assessment of culture diverges from that of management (employees, or both). In terms of economic significance, a change in tone from neutral to positive by an analyst who identifies the greatest number of culture causes and effects

relative to her peers (whose view of culture is one standard deviation away from that of management, employees, or both) is associated with an additional three-day abnormal return of 44.9 (27.1) basis points around the release date of her report, corresponding to a \$155.7 (94.1) million increase in market value for an average firm in the sample. We conclude that analysts' research on culture offers new insights into its causes and effects and that we are one step closer than prior work to establishing the culture-firm value link.

We contribute to the literature in three ways. First, our study provides new insights into corporate culture from the vantage points of firms' various stakeholders: equity analysts, management, and employees. By applying generative AI to rich and granular textual data for information extraction, we reveal the causes and effects of different culture types that have been difficult, if not impossible, to uncover in prior work. As such, our paper extends prior work that studies corporate culture (see, for example, [Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015](#); [Grennan 2019](#); [Au, Dong, and Tremblay 2021](#); [Li, Liu, Mai, and Zhang 2021](#); [Li, Mai, Shen, and Yan 2021](#); [Briscoe-Tran 2022](#); [Graham et al. 2022a, 2022b](#); [Huang et al. 2024](#); [Li, Chen, and Shen 2024](#)) by conducting the first large-scale study of three distinct stakeholder groups' different perspectives on culture using a uniform methodological approach; we further investigate why such divergence occurs. Our novel findings of different stakeholder groups' diverging perspectives on culture facilitate a better understanding of the mechanisms through which culture affects business outcomes and have a wide range of management implications.

Second, our study contributes to the literature on big data and machine learning in finance, accounting, and economics ([Gentzkow, Kelly, and Taddy 2019](#); [Goldstein, Spatt, and Ye 2021](#)). Contemporaneous research demonstrates the power of generative AI models in enabling capital market participants to derive new information and glean valuable insights from large quantities of textual data ([Bai et al. 2023](#); [Bybee 2023](#); [Jha et al. 2023](#); [Kim, Muhn, and Nikolaev 2023](#); [Li, Tu, and Zhou 2023](#); [Lopez-Lira and Tang 2023](#)). Several papers explore the impact of generative AI on firm value and stock returns ([Eisfeldt et al. 2023](#); [Babina et al. 2024](#); [Bertomeu et al. 2025](#)). Our study differs from the current research in two important ways. First, we apply generative AI for structured information extraction rather than text classification or prediction tasks and demonstrate its effectiveness. Our approach yields a multifaceted output that encompasses different culture types and their respective causes or effects. Second, we combine the versatility of generative AI models such as GPT—which are constrained by factors such as speed, cost, and context length limitations—with the efficiency of smaller large language models such as Bidirectional Encoder Representation from Transformers (BERT) models ([Devlin et al. 2018](#)), to effectively filter and retrieve the most relevant information.

Our study highlights certain unique considerations and design elements that must be addressed to harness the full potential of generative AI models

in the context of financial text analysis. For instance, a step-by-step, chain-of-thought prompting strategy is beneficial for extracting perceived cause–effect relationships—a task that requires high-level reasoning (Wei et al. 2022). Furthermore, most generative AI models face inherent challenges when analyzing long documents (Liu et al. 2024). We demonstrate that feeding smaller segments related to corporate culture, while allowing for the dynamic augmentation of input segments by searching for relevant information from a full report, can enhance the overall capability of these models.

Third, our study contributes to the literature on equity analysts, particularly the strand applying textual analyses to analyst reports, to gain insights into their information discovery and interpretation roles (e.g., Asquith, Mikhail, and Au 2005; Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014; Huang et al. 2018; Bellstam, Bhagat, and Cookson 2021; Li et al. Forthcoming). By applying generative AI to analyst reports, our research sheds light on the “black box” of analysts’ fundamental research by not only underscoring culture as an integral input but also elucidating the deductive processes analysts employ to transform qualitative, soft information into actionable insights (e.g., stock recommendations).

## 1. Our Information-Extraction Method

This section describes our method for extracting cultural cause–effect relationships from analyst reports. Figure 1 presents a flowchart of how we apply generative AI to extract analysts’ perspectives on corporate culture from their reports. We provide an overview of the key steps, including data preprocessing, triple extraction, and output validation. The implementation details, including modifications made to extract similar information from earnings calls and employee reviews, are provided in the [Internet Appendix](#), and the code is available upon request.<sup>1</sup>


### 1.1 Culture-related segments in reports

Our primary data consists of over 2.4 million analyst reports from Thomson One’s Investext database covering the S&P 1500 constituent firms from 2000 to 2020.<sup>2</sup> We obtain the report date, gvkey, lead analyst name (including last name and first name initial), and broker name from the meta file. We convert the reports from PDF to plain text. To address the loss of paragraph structure during conversion, we implement the C99 algorithm developed by Choi (2000)

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<sup>1</sup> For methodological consistency and to facilitate direct comparisons across different corpora, we employ the same taxonomies of culture types, causes, and effects.

<sup>2</sup> Our 243 thousand earnings calls over the period 2004–2020 are from Capital IQ Transcripts database. Our 5.3 million Glassdoor employee reviews over the period 2008–2020 are from Revelio Labs. Section A.7 of the [Internet Appendix](#) describes sample formation steps. Section B of the [Internet Appendix](#) describes how we match an analyst’s name in a report to her analyst ID in the Institutional Brokers Estimates System (I/B/E/S) database, to construct analyst characteristic variables.

**Figure 1****Flowchart of our information-extraction method**

This figure presents a flowchart that shows how our generative AI model extracts information about corporate culture from 2.4 million analyst reports over the period 2000–2020. Source: Authors' creation.

to reconstruct coherent text segments.<sup>3</sup> We then implement a machine learning model to filter out boilerplate content from reports.<sup>4</sup>

We employ a three-stage approach to find culture-related discussions in reports. First, we conduct a keyword search using terms explicitly related to corporate culture (e.g., “corporate culture” or “workplace culture”) to find the segments. Second, we implement a hybrid machine learning classifier to capture segments that discuss culture without using these keywords. The classifier uses a BERT model trained on segments containing clear cultural keywords to identify segments with similar semantic patterns. Third, we use generative AI to filter these candidate segments and retain only those that substantively discuss organizational culture (Table IA2 in the [Internet Appendix](#) details the prompt used.). This approach captures both overt cultural discussions and segments in which analysts examine culture through descriptions of organizational practices or values. Our final data set comprises 138,545 culture-related segments in 86,112 reports.

<sup>3</sup> The C99 algorithm is a text segmentation method that identifies coherent segments within a document. It calculates a similarity score between pairs of sentences and uses those scores to determine where to place segment boundaries. Intuitively, the algorithm groups together consecutive sentences that discuss similar topics or concepts, thereby reconstructing the logical paragraph-like structure of a report.

<sup>4</sup> The data set for training consists of segments in reports produced by the top 20 brokers, with positive examples identified as the most frequently repeated segments and negative examples as those least repeated. We fine-tune a BERT model to classify boilerplate segments automatically; the trained model demonstrates high accuracy. Table IA1 in the [Internet Appendix](#) lists predicted boilerplate probabilities and boilerplate examples, sorted by decile. We retain segments with a boilerplate probability of 0.22 (the sample median) or lower.

## 1.2 Cause–effect relationship extraction

For each report, we combine culture-related segments into a single input document. We use GPT-4o (Achiam et al. 2023), specifically the GPT-4o mini model, to analyze the input. This choice follows an evaluation of multiple models based on accuracy and computational efficiency. We then use a prompt (shown in [Table 1](#), panel A) that guides the GPT-4o model to identify the specific culture type discussed and categorize it into one of six predefined culture types. The prompt also instructs the model to assess the overall sentiment or tone of the culture-related discussion; to determine if the segment contains a detailed causal analysis; and, if it does, to extract those specific factors that influence the culture type (ie, causes) and those specific business outcomes affected by the culture type (ie, effects); and to then summarize the causal relationships in a structured, triple format.

The six predefined culture types in the prompt (collaboration and people-focused, customer-oriented, innovation and adaptability, integrity and risk management, performance-oriented, and miscellaneous) are derived through a two-stage process. In a pilot study, we manually review the most frequently occurring culture-related phrases across reports. Through discussion and reference to the original reports, we group those phrases into broad culture types guided by the literature (see [Table IA3](#) in the [Internet Appendix](#) for a survey of prior work). We then validate and refine those initial categories using a data-driven approach. We embed all of the extracted culture types into a vector space using a BERT model and apply hierarchical clustering. By inspecting the clusters and mapping them to the manually defined categories, we arrive at the final set of six culture types that capture the main culture-related themes in analyst discussions.

After extracting those phrases that represent the causes and effects of each culture type, we conduct a similar two-stage process to map them to standardized entity names. We first embed all extracted causes and effects into a vector space and group them into 50 clusters. After a manual review of these clusters, we arrive at a set of 18 standardized cause (e.g., M&As and management change) and 17 effect entities (e.g., profitability and resilience) that capture the key themes in analyst culture-related discussions. Each standardized entity is associated with 5–10 representative phrases to illustrate its scope. We then create a prompt (shown in [Table 1](#), panel B) that provides the standardized cause/effect entities and their associated examples. For each extracted cause or effect phrase, the prompt instructs the model to map it to the most appropriate standardized entity based on its similarity to the provided examples. Finally, we canonicalize the extracted cause–effect relationship triples by assigning one end of each triple to a culture type and another end to a standardized cause or effect; we then classify the relationship’s direction (ie,  $->$  for cause to effect,  $<-$  for effect to cause, or  $<->$  for bidirectional). This approach allows us to extract granular yet standardized triples about the antecedents and consequences of corporate culture from unstructured analyst

**Table 1**  
**Prompts for our generative AI model**

*A. Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompt*

<p>As an expert specializing in corporate culture and causal reasoning, your task is to analyze segments from analyst reports about corporate culture. Your goal is to extract and interpret information about a company's corporate culture and identify cause-effect relationships. Present your findings in a structured JSON format. Let's think step by step.</p> <p>Step-by-Step Instructions:</p>	
<p>1. Summarize the Corporate Culture (Q1):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Task: Determine the specific corporate culture being discussed in the segment.</li> <li>- Action: Summarize it in a short phrase starting with an adjective. If corporate culture is not explicitly mentioned, infer it from the context.</li> <li>- Note: Avoid using generic adjectives such as strong/weak or positive/negative culture. <u>If more context from the report is needed for the analysis, output "I need more context" in the relevant JSON field.</u></li> </ul>	
<p>2. Classify the Corporate Culture (Q2):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Task: Categorize the identified corporate culture into one of the following six types: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>* Collaboration and People-Focused: Focusing on (or deficient in) collaboration, cooperation, teamwork, supportive, low levels of conflict, community, communication within an organization, employee well-being, employee equity sharing and compensation, diversity, inclusion, empowerment, or talent.</li> <li>* Customer-Oriented: Focusing on (or deficient in) sales, customer, customer service, listening to the customer, customer retention, customer experience, customer satisfaction, user experience, client service, being brand-driven, quality of product, quality of service, quality of solution, or taking pride in service.</li> <li>* Innovation and Adaptability: Focusing on (or deficient in) innovation, creativity, technology, entrepreneurship, adaptability, transformations, flexibility, agility, willingness to experiment, beyond tradition, disruption, fast-moving, quick to take advantage of opportunities, resilience to change, or taking initiative.</li> <li>* Integrity and Risk Management: Focusing on (or deficient in) integrity, high ethical standards, being honest, being transparent, accountability, do the right thing, fair practices, being trustworthy, risk management, risk control, compliance, discipline, or financial prudence.</li> <li>* Performance-Oriented: Focusing on (or deficient in) high expectations for performance, sales growth, achievement, competitiveness, results, hard work, efficiency, productivity, consistency in executing tasks, setting clear goals, following best practices, striving for operational excellence, or exceeding benchmarks.</li> <li>* Miscellaneous: Nonspecific corporate culture or corporate culture that does not easily fit into the above types. For example, "strong culture," "weak culture," "positive culture," "negative culture," or "cultural change" (without details on the company's culture).</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
<p>3. Identify Detailed Causal Analysis (Q3):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Task: Determine if the segment contains a detailed causal analysis of corporate culture.</li> <li>- Criteria: Look for explicit causal reasoning statements with trigger words like affect, cause, influence, lead to, result in, fosters, driven by.</li> <li>- Action: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- If YES, provide a short reason demonstrating the in-depth analysis.</li> <li>- If NO, the answers for Questions 4 or 5 should be an empty array [].</li> <li>- <u>If more context is needed, output "I need more context" in the relevant JSON field.</u></li> </ul> </li> </ul>	
<p>4. Identify Causes of Corporate Culture (Q4):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Task: If a detailed causal analysis exists, identify explicitly mentioned events or factors that have shaped, changed, or will change the corporate culture.</li> <li>- Action: List the most important causes or return an empty array [] if not applicable.</li> <li>- Note: Do not list other corporate culture types as causes. Focus on specific people, systems, or events. Avoid implicit or indirect causes.</li> </ul>	
<p>5. Identify Outcomes from Corporate Culture (Q5):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Task: If a detailed causal analysis exists, identify explicitly mentioned past, present, or future outcomes or impacts of the corporate culture on the company.</li> <li>- Action: List the most important outcomes or return an empty array [] if not applicable.</li> <li>- Note: Do not list other corporate culture types as outcomes. Focus on specific results, business outcomes, or tangible impacts. Avoid implicit or indirect outcomes.</li> </ul>	
<p>6. Determine the Tone (Q6):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Task: Assess the tone of the discussion about corporate culture.</li> <li>- Options: "positive," "negative," "neutral".</li> <li>- Note: If the tone is unclear, mark it as "neutral".</li> </ul>	
<p>7. Extract Causal Graph Triples (Q7):</p>	

(Continued)

discussions. [Table IA4](#) in the [Internet Appendix](#) lists some representative examples of the extracted culture types and their causes and effects.

To enhance the model's ability to extract complex causal relationships, we augment it with two key techniques. First, we use chain-of-thought prompting

**Table 1**  
(Continued)

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Task: Based on the answers from Q1 (the specific corporate culture), Q4 (causes of corporate culture), and Q5 (outcomes from corporate culture), extract causal graph triples related to that specific culture.</li> <li>- Format: For each triple, provide: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Triple: ["entity_1," "relation," "entity_2"]</li> <li>- Explanation: A brief reason citing specific words or phrases or logical reasoning.</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Criteria: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- "entity_1" or "entity_2": Must be the specific corporate culture identified from Q1.</li> <li>- "relation": A clear and simple verb phrase conveying the cause-effect direction.</li> <li>- The Other Entity: Should be a cause (people, systems, or events) or outcome (result, impact) for the specific corporate culture, not another corporate culture.</li> <li>- Avoid: Both entities being corporate culture.</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<p>JSON Output Structure:</p> <pre>{   "all_results": [     {       "input_id": "XXXX",       "identified_corporate_culture": "adjective + specific corporate culture" or "I need more context,"       "corporate_culture_type": "one of the six types" or "I need more context,"       "detailed_causal_analysis": "YES" or "NO" or "I need more context,"       "causes_of_culture": ["cause_1," "..."] or [],       "outcomes_from_culture": ["outcome_1," "..."] or [],       "tone": "positive" / "negative" / "neutral,"       "causal_graph_triples": [         {           "triple": ["entity_1," "relation," "entity_2"],           "explanation": "Reason for identifying the causal relation, citing specific words or phrases or logical reasoning."         }         // ... additional triples       ] or []     },     {       "input_id": "YYYY",       "identified_corporate_culture": "adjective + specific corporate culture" or "I need more context,"       "corporate_culture_type": "one of the six types" or "I need more context,"       "detailed_causal_analysis": "YES" or "NO,"       "causes_of_culture": ["cause_1," "..."] or [],       "outcomes_from_culture": ["outcome_1," "..."] or [],       "tone": "positive" / "negative" / "neutral,"       "causal_graph_triples": [         {           "triple": ["entity_1," "relation," "entity_2"],           "explanation": "Reason for identifying the causal relation, citing specific words or phrases or logical reasoning."         }         // ... additional triples       ] or []     }     // ... other inputs   ] }</pre>

(Continued)

(Wei et al. 2022) to break down the model's reasoning process into discrete steps. By providing a detailed step-by-step prompt, we enable the model to systematically analyze different aspects of the culture-related discussion before integrating that information into a cause–effect knowledge graph.

Second, we employ retrieval augmented generation (RAG, Lewis et al. 2020), which allows the model to request additional context if needed to complete the cause (effect) analysis. If the model outputs "I need more context" for any of the prompted questions, we dynamically retrieve other relevant segments in a report and provide them as additional input. To ensure the additional context is about corporate culture, we filter and retain only those

**Table 1**  
(Continued)

*B. Prompt to canonicalize causes and effects of a culture type*

<p>As an expert specializing in corporate culture and causal reasoning, conduct entity canonicalization on selected phrases taken from analyst reports. These phrases are considered to be *causes (consequences) of corporate culture*. Your objective is to map each phrase to the most appropriate standardized entity name from the predefined list below.</p> <p>Instructions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Review the provided examples for each standardized entity to grasp their scope and nuances.</li> <li>- Carefully analyze each phrase and assign it to the most fitting standardized entity based on its underlying meaning.</li> <li>- Assign the phrase to "Other" only if it does not align with any of the predefined entities. Before assigning a phrase to "Other", ensure that it does not reasonably fit any existing categories.</li> </ul> <p>The available standardized entity names and examples are:</p> <p>----</p> <p>[Categories and examples of causes (see Table IA4 for details)]</p> <p>----</p> <p>JSON Output Structure:</p> <pre>{   "all_results": [     {       "input_phrase_id": 1,       "input_phrase": "",       "canonical_entity": "One of the predefined standardized entity names or 'Other'"     },     {       "input_phrase_id": 2,       "input_phrase": "",       "canonical_entity": "One of the predefined standardized entity names or 'Other'"     }     ...   ] }</pre>
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This table presents the detailed instructions given to our generative AI model to analyze and canonicalize information from corporate culture-related segments in analyst reports. Panel A shows the main prompt outlining the step-by-step process that the model follows to extract information from each culture-related segment. It starts with identifying a culture type (e.g., innovation and adaptability), followed by extracting information on its causes, effects, and tones. The final step involves generating cause–effect triples with their representation in a standard digital format called JSON (JavaScript Object Notation). When more context is requested by the model, this is done through retrieval augmented generation (RAG); the underlined sections in panel A are omitted. Panel B shows the prompt to canonicalize causes and effects of a culture type.

segments exceeding the 75<sup>th</sup> percentile of culture-relevance probabilities based on our BERT culture classification model. Importantly, we provide extra context only in response to the model’s request to avoid biasing the analysis with potentially irrelevant information. [Table IA5](#) in the [Internet Appendix](#) provides examples illustrating how the additional context helps the model make inferences. [Table IA6](#) provides examples of cause or effect relationships in analyst reports extracted by our model.

### 1.3 Model performance and discussion

In this section, we evaluate the performance of three mainstream generative AI models. The first model belongs to the GPT model series developed by OpenAI: GPT-4o mini. The second model belongs to the Claude model series developed by Anthropic: Claude 3.5 Haiku. The third model belongs to Alphabet’s Gemini model series, specifically, Gemini 1.5 Flash. These three models share a similar cost per token. Our evaluation involves manually

**Table 2**  
**Performance evaluation of different generative AI models**

Performance metric	AI model	Culture type	Cause	Effect	Tone
Accuracy	GPT-4o mini	98.5%	84.0%	91.0%	97.5%
	Claude 3.5 Haiku	93.0%	72.0%	77.5%	96.5%
	Gemini 1.5 Flash	94.0%	75.5%	79.5%	95.0%
Precision	GPT-4o mini	98.5%	80.0%	98.4%	97.5%
	Claude 3.5 Haiku	93.0%	75.5%	76.8%	96.5%
	Gemini 1.5 Flash	94.0%	74.4%	84.6%	95.0%
Recall	GPT-4o mini	100.0%	77.9%	88.7%	100.0%
	Claude 3.5 Haiku	100.0%	48.2%	93.0%	100.0%
	Gemini 1.5 Flash	100.0%	68.5%	86.4%	100.0%
F1	GPT-4o mini	99.2%	78.9%	93.3%	98.7%
	Claude 3.5 Haiku	96.4%	58.8%	84.1%	98.2%
	Gemini 1.5 Flash	96.9%	71.3%	85.5%	97.4%

This table presents the performance evaluation of the different generative AI models in terms of extracting culture types, causes, effects, and tones. We compare the performance of GPT-4o mini, Claude 3.5 Haiku, and Gemini 1.5 Flash in terms of accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 against human annotations of a randomly chosen set of 200 culture-related segments. We group our fact-checking into four scenarios. True positive denotes a scenario in which generative AI extracts similar information about culture type, cause, and effect relations as we do. False positive denotes a scenario in which generative AI extracts different (false) information from what we do. True negative denotes a scenario in which generative AI extracts no information and neither do we. False negative denotes a scenario in which generative AI extracts false information while we do not find relevant information. We compute four performance metrics. Accuracy is defined as (#True Positive + #True Negative)/(#True Positive + #False Positive + #False Negative + #True Negative), and measures how accurate a model is at correctly classifying culture-related information of the 200 segments. Precision is defined as (#True Positive)/(#True Positive + #False Positive) and measures how accurate a model is at identifying correct (positive) culture-related information of all culture-related information that is predicted to be positive. Recall is defined as (#True Positive)/(#True Positive + #False Negative), and measures how accurate a model is at identifying correct (positive) culture-related information of all identified culture-related information. F1 is the harmonic mean of Precision and Recall.

annotating culture types, causes, effects, and tones in 200 randomly selected, culture-related segments and comparing them with the relationships and tones extracted by the generative AI models. Table 2 presents the model performance results using accuracy, precision, recall, and F1 scores.

In terms of accuracy, GPT-4o mini achieves 98.5%, 84.0%, 91.0% for culture types, causes, and effects, respectively. Claude 3.5 Haiku achieves 93.0%, 72.0%, and 77.5%. Gemini 1.5 Flash achieves 94.0%, 75.5%, and 79.5%. We find similar results using precision, recall, and F1. In terms of tones in culture-related segments, we show that GPT-4o mini achieves an accuracy of 97.5%, slightly outperforming Claude 3.5 Haiku and Gemini 1.5 Flash, which achieve accuracies of 96.5% and 95.0%, respectively.<sup>5</sup>

In summary, we find that all three models exhibit good model performance when extracting culture types, causes, effects, and tones in textual data. GPT-4o mini has an edge over Claude 3.5 Haiku and Gemini 1.5 Flash, especially for identifying causes and effects. In the remainder of this paper, we employ GPT-4o mini as our primary AI model to conduct the analyses.

<sup>5</sup> For comparison, when using a prompt that requests the full output in a single pass, as opposed to CoT's multistep approach, GPT-4o mini achieves accuracy rates of 89.0%, 72.0%, 77.0%, and 93.0% for culture types, causes, effects, and tone, respectively. These results suggest that CoT prompting notably enhances the model's ability to identify causes and effects.

**Table 3**  
**Validating corporate culture types**

*A. Validating the collaboration and people-focused culture*

Variable	Workforce score	Workforce score	Employee overall rating	Employee overall rating
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Collaboration and people-focused tone	.034*** (.006)	.024*** (.005)	.031** (.014)	.027** (.013)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.187	.260	.039	.114
Observations	19,366	19,366	13,353	13,353

*B. Validating the customer-oriented culture*

Variable	Consumer complaints	Consumer complaints	Brand value	Brand value
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Customer-oriented tone	-.015*** (.004)	-.013*** (.004)	.029*** (.006)	.022*** (.005)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.039	.053	.114	.165
Observations	19,195	19,195	19,378	19,378

*C. Validating the innovation and adaptability culture*

Variable	ln(1+Patent)	ln(1+Patent)	R&D spending	R&D spending
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Innovation and adaptability tone	.313*** (.058)	.238*** (.052)	.009*** (.001)	.002*** (.001)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.171	.354	.167	.449
Observations	12,730	12,730	35,973	35,973

(Continued)

There are two general concerns when applying generative AI: look-ahead bias and hallucination. Look-ahead bias refers to using future information not available at the time of prediction. Our application focuses on extracting analysts' perspectives (or executives' or employees' perspectives) of corporate culture rather than making out-of-sample predictions. Moreover, our regression analyses primarily use information available at the time of a report's publication. In short, our approach and research design by construction mitigate look-ahead bias concerns. Nonetheless, as a robustness check, we employ entity masking following [Jha et al. \(2023\)](#). Using the spaCy natural language processing model, we replace firm names with "ORGANIZATION," person names with "PERSON," and product names with "PRODUCT." In a random sample of 1,000 culture-related segments, the tone agreement between the masked and the unmasked text is 89%. This high agreement rate suggests

**Table 3**  
(Continued)

D. *Validating the integrity and risk management culture*

Variable	Restatement	Restatement	Return volatility	Return volatility
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Integrity and risk management tone	-.017*** (.006)	-.015** (.006)	-.006*** (.001)	-.004*** (.001)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.004	.035	.197	.391
Observations	35,973	35,973	35,596	35,596

E. *Validating the performance-oriented culture*

Variable	ROA	ROA	Sales growth	Sales growth
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Performance-oriented tone	.007*** (.001)	.007*** (.001)	.016*** (.003)	.017*** (.003)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Year FE	NO	YES	NO	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.381	.401	.016	.097
Observations	35,973	35,973	35,940	35,940

This table validates the corporate culture types extracted from analyst reports. Panel A correlates the analysts' tone in discussing the collaboration and people-focused culture with *Workforce score* and *Employee overall rating*. Panel B correlates the analysts' tone in discussing the customer-oriented culture with *Consumer complaints* and *Brand value*. Panel C correlates the analysts' tone in discussing the innovation and adaptability culture with *Ln(1+Patent)* and *R&D spending*. Panel D correlates the analysts' tone in discussing the integrity and risk management culture with *Restatement* and *Return volatility*. Panel E correlates the analysts' tone in discussing the performance-oriented culture with *ROA* and *Sales growth*. The control variables include lagged firm size and ROA. Industry fixed effects (FE) are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

that our main results are unlikely driven by the model exploiting entity-specific information across time periods.

Hallucination refers to generated text that ignores or is unfaithful to source material (Maynez, et al. 2020). A key strategy to mitigate hallucination is to improve the alignment between the input and the generated output (Ji et al. 2023). Our approach ensures that the input segments align closely with what the prompt asks for, because those segments either contain explicit culture-related keywords or are selected through a multistage filtering process. Moreover, we implement additional safeguards in our prompt design. The prompt requires explicit textual evidence for each cause (effect) relationship by instructing the model to “focus on specific results, business outcomes, or tangible impacts” and to “avoid implicit or indirect outcomes” (Table 1, panel A, Q5). For each relationship, the model must provide a “reason for identifying the causal relation, citing specific words or phrases or logical reasoning” from the text (Table 1, panel A, Q7). Our chain-of-thought prompting guides the model to reason strictly within a report’s content in discrete steps. We also give the model an explicit option to output “N/A” or empty arrays when there is no information

or when cause (effect) relationships cannot be confidently determined from the text. These design choices help constrain the model to extract only relationships that are directly supported by the source material.

#### 1.4 Validating corporate culture types extracted from reports

In this section, we validate our corporate culture measure extracted from analyst reports using well-established markers for best practices in the corporate world.

To validate the collaboration and people-focused culture, we use *Workforce score* and *Employee overall rating*. The variable *Workforce score* measures a company's effectiveness regarding job satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, maintaining diversity and equal opportunities, and providing development opportunities for its workforce. The data come from the Refinitiv ESG data set. The variable *Employee overall rating* is the average of the employee overall ratings of their workplaces at a firm in a year. The data come from Glassdoor (Green et al. 2019). To validate the customer-oriented culture, we use *Consumer complaints* and *Brand value*. The former is the number of times a company is in the media spotlight due to consumer complaints or dissatisfaction directly linked to its products or services. The latter is the total value of a company's brands. Both measures are from the Refinitiv ESG data set. To validate the innovation and adaptability culture, we use *Ln(I+Patent)* and *R&D spending*. *Ln(I+Patent)* is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of patents filed and eventually granted in a year. The data come from Kogan et al. (2017). *R&D spending* is R&D expenditures normalized by total assets. To validate the integrity and risk management culture, we use *Restatement* and *Return volatility*. *Restatement* is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm later restates its (annual or quarterly) financial statements and 0 otherwise. The data come from Audit Analytics. *Return volatility* is the standard deviation of annual ROA, calculated over the past three years. To validate the performance-oriented culture, we use *ROA* and *Sales growth*.

Table 3 presents the results of the validation tests using the extracted tones in the analysts' analyses of specific culture types. In panel A, we show that analysts' positive tones in discussing the collaboration and people-focused culture are positively and significantly associated with both of our best employment practice measures. This positive association remains after controlling for industry and year fixed effects as well as firm size and operating performance.<sup>6</sup> In panel B, we show that analysts' positive tones in discussing the customer-oriented culture are negatively and significantly associated with the number of consumer complaints and positively and significantly

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<sup>6</sup> In an untabulated analysis, using Glassdoor employees' culture and values ratings as an alternative marker for employee satisfaction, we find a positive and significant association between analysts' positive tones in discussing the collaboration and people-focused culture and this alternative marker.

associated with brand value. In panel C, we show that analysts' positive tones in discussing the innovation and adaptability culture are positively and significantly associated with both of our measures of corporate innovation—the number of patents granted and the amount of R&D expenditures. In panel D, we show that analysts' positive tones in discussing the integrity and risk management culture are negatively and significantly associated with firms' likelihood of restatements and operating performance volatility. Finally, in panel E, we show that analysts' positive tones in discussing the performance-oriented culture are positively and significantly associated with both operating performance and sales growth.<sup>7</sup>

In summary, the validation tests in [Table 3](#) reassure us that analysts' focus on a specific culture type is meaningfully associated with its implied practices and corporate outcomes and that our information extraction performed as expected.

### 1.5 Analysts' culture analyses and M&As

Using M&As as a testing ground, we explore whether and how analysts' research on culture predicts price reactions to deal announcements. The dependent variable is the three-day cumulative abnormal return around a deal announcement. The key variables of interest are analysts' tones in discussing culture with M&As as either a cause or an effect, analysts' tones in discussing culture with M&As only as a cause of cultural change, and analysts' tones in discussing culture with M&As only as an effect. We also include analysts' tones in discussing culture without any reference to M&As, analysts' tones in the rest of their reports, and deal and firm characteristics. All report-related measures are taken over the 90-day period prior to a deal announcement. [Table 4](#) presents the results. In column 1, we show that there is a positive and significant association between analysts' tones in discussing culture with M&As as either a cause or an effect of cultural change and the price reaction to deal announcements. In contrast, two other tone measures are not significantly correlated with the price reaction to deal announcements. In column 2, we further decompose analysts' discussions of culture and M&As into M&As as a cause and as an effect of cultural change and show that the positive associations are derived from analysts' tones in discussing culture with M&As as an effect of cultural change.

We next explore whether analysts reference corporate culture in light of price reactions to deal announcements. In this analysis, the dependent variable

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<sup>7</sup> We also run a horse race using the tones of analysts, executives, and employees in discussing culture and relate those three measures to firm performance measures. [Table IA7](#) in the [Internet Appendix](#) presents the results. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) show that analysts' tones in discussing culture are consistently, positively, and significantly associated with ROA and sales growth 1 and 3 years out, whereas executives' (employees') tones in discussing culture do not exhibit consistent positive and significant associations with either performance measure. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) repeat the analysis, controlling for analysts' tones in sections of their reports that do not discuss culture. Our main findings remain. We conclude that analysts' insights into corporate culture, given their financial intermediary role, are more accurate than are management's (employees') in predicting future firm performance.

**Table 4**  
**Analysts' culture analyses related to M&As and announcement period returns**

Variable	Acquirer CAR[-1,+1] (1)	Acquirer CAR[-1,+1] (2)	Postbid M&A discussion (3)
Prebid M&A discussion tone	.027** (.011)		
Prebid M&As as cause tone		-.006 (.012)	
Prebid M&As as effect tone		.048*** (.012)	
Tone	-.003 (.004)	-.002 (.005)	
Nonculture tone	.003 (.016)	.002 (.017)	
Acquirer CAR[-1,+1]			-.250** (.108)
Acquirer ROA	.026 (.020)	.026 (.020)	.003 (.046)
Acquirer Tobin's Q	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)	.003 (.004)
Acquirer size	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.002)	.015 (.009)
Acquirer leverage	.002 (.009)	.002 (.009)	-.082** (.027)
Target ROA	-.008 (.011)	-.008 (.011)	.027 (.024)
Target Tobin's Q	-.001** (.000)	-.001** (.000)	.006** (.002)
Target size	-.003 (.002)	-.003 (.002)	.052*** (.009)
Target leverage	.017* (.008)	.017* (.008)	-.078 (.051)
Relative size	-.011*** (.002)	-.011*** (.002)	-.002 (.008)
Industry FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.042	.044	.099
Observations	1,783	1,783	1,783

This table examines the relationship between analysts' culture analyses related to M&As and announcement period returns. The sample comprises 1,783 deal announcements involving public acquirers and public targets over the period 2000-2020. *Prebid M&A discussion tone* is the average tone of analysts' culture analyses with M&As as either a cause or an effect in reports over the 90-day period before a deal announcement. *Prebid M&As as cause tone* is the average tone of analysts' culture analyses with M&As only as a cause in reports over the 90-day period before a deal announcement. *Prebid M&As as effect tone* is the average tone of analysts' culture analyses with M&As only as an effect in reports over the 90-day period before a deal announcement. *Acquirer CAR[-1,+1]* is an acquirer's cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) centered around the M&A announcement date (day 0) based on a market model. *Postbid M&A discussion* is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if analysts' culture analyses relate to M&As as either a cause or an effect in reports over the 90-day period after a deal announcement and 0 otherwise. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

is an indicator variable for whether analysts discuss culture with M&As as either a cause or an effect over the 90-day period after a deal announcement. The key variable of interest is the three-day cumulative abnormal return. In column 3, we show that there is a negative and significant association between the price reaction to deal announcements and the likelihood of analysts discussing culture and M&As, suggesting that if a deal is poorly received by the

market (with acquirers experiencing a price drop), analysts are more likely to discuss culture and M&As in their reports. In summary, our findings suggest that analysts' insights into culture and M&As predict price reactions to deal announcements.

## 2. Comparing Different Stakeholder Groups' Perspectives on Corporate Culture

### 2.1 The cause–effect knowledge graph from reports

Our generative AI model allows us to identify the events, people, or systems that significantly influence a specific culture type and to determine which culture type has the greatest impact on specific business outcomes. [Figure 2](#) plots the cause–effect knowledge graph, capturing how analysts conceptualize corporate culture's causes and effects.

The graph is divided into three columns of entities: (1) the left column lists the seventeen drivers of culture grouped by events, people, and systems suggested by [Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales \(2015\)](#); [Graham et al. \(2022a, 2022b\)](#); and [Grennan and Li \(2023\)](#) (omitting the miscellaneous category); (2) the center column lists the five culture types (omitting the miscellaneous category); and (3) the right column lists the sixteen effects of culture (omitting the miscellaneous category). The height of each entity (a culture type, a cause, or an effect) denotes the number of relevant segments, thereby providing an intuitive visual representation of each entity's prominence. The width of each line linking a cause to a culture type (or a culture type to its effect) denotes the number of segments mentioning a particular cause or effect relation. We make the following observations.

First, different culture types are influenced by different people, event, or system factors. For example, the performance-oriented culture and the innovation and adaptability culture emerge primarily from business strategy and management teams (and turnover), while a collaboration and people-focused culture stems predominantly from people-centered factors such as management teams and employee hiring and retention practices. An integrity and risk management culture is more likely to prevail in response to regulatory issues.

Second, different people, event, or system factors exhibit different scopes of influences on corporate culture. We show that customer relations primarily shape the customer-oriented culture, employee hiring and retention predominantly influences the collaboration and people-focused culture, and regulatory issues almost exclusively affect the integrity and risk management culture. In contrast, systemic factors like business strategy and key people factors such as management teams (and turnover) exert broad influences on multiple culture types, consistent with their critical roles in driving firm performance. We show that those same factors also play a significant role in shaping organizational culture.




Figure 2

## Cause-effect knowledge graph of corporate culture

This figure summarizes the major cause–effect relationships involving corporate culture extracted from analyst reports (omitting the miscellaneous category). Our sample comprises 2.4 million analyst reports over the period 2000–2020. In the left column, we group the 17 causes into three groups: events, people, and systems. In the center column, we list the five culture types. In the right column, we color-code the 16 business outcomes by tone. The height of each entity (cause, culture type, or effect) corresponds to the number of relevant segments. The width of each link corresponds to the number of segments mentioning a particular cause or effect relation. Source: Authors' creation.

Third, different culture types vary in their effects on business outcomes. We show that the collaboration and people-focused culture and the innovation and adaptability culture have the broadest impacts on a wide range of business outcomes, from risk management, customer satisfaction, to market share and growth, and profitability. In contrast, a customer-oriented culture concentrates its impacts on customer satisfaction and market share and growth, while an integrity and risk management culture primarily affects risk management practices. To the best of our knowledge, such insights are wholly absent from the literature on corporate culture.

In the effect column, we use a color-coding scheme to represent analysts' tones in culture-related segments, with darker shades signifying more negative tones. We find that market share and growth, customer satisfaction, and innovation are viewed positively, whereas misconduct, internal conflicts, and risk management are viewed negatively in analysts' analyses of business outcomes relating to culture. In our sample, slightly over 60% of analysts have positive tones when discussing culture.


Overall, [Figure 2](#) provides a comprehensive visualization of analysts' perspectives on corporate culture spanning different culture types, and their causes and effects. The question inevitably arises regarding whether and how the perspectives of different stakeholder groups regarding culture diverge.

## 2.2 Comparing different stakeholder groups' perspectives on culture

To shed light on the extent to which analysts' perspectives on corporate culture align with or deviate from those of management (employees), we visualize the frequency of different culture types, causes, and effects across analyst reports, earnings calls, and Glassdoor employee reviews in [Figure 3](#).

Panel A compares the frequency of culture types. We note that both analysts and management identify the following cultures as the most important to them: 1) innovation and adaptability, 2) performance-oriented, and 3) customer-oriented. In contrast, employees value the collaboration and people-focused culture the most, which is consistent with their lived experiences of organizational culture and how it affects them personally. Analysts view the integrity and risk management culture as more important than management and employees do, consistent with the former's monitoring roles.

Panels B and C present the frequency of different causes and effects of corporate culture. Two general observations emerge. First, we see a general agreement in the ranking of these causes (effects) across the three sources, especially a stronger agreement regarding the relative importance of different effects compared to different causes of culture. This strong agreement lends validity to our approach to extracting cultural insights from unstructured textual data using generative AI. Second, for the majority of the causes and effects, the frequency with which they appear in analyst reports falls between those in earnings calls and in employee reviews. This balanced perspective of analysts indicates that they incorporate both management's strategic framing

**Figure 3****Different stakeholder groups' perspectives on corporate culture**

This figure compares the frequency of different culture types, causes, and effects in analyst reports, earnings conference calls, and Glassdoor employee reviews (omitting the miscellaneous category). Panel A compares the frequency of the five culture types in different corpora. The horizontal axis lists the different culture types, and the vertical axis indicates the percentage of segments from each corpus that mention a given culture type. Purple bars represent analyst reports, navy blue bars represent earnings calls, and green bars represent Glassdoor employee reviews. Panels B and C compare the frequency of the 17 causes and 16 effects of corporate culture, respectively. The horizontal axis indicates the percentage of segments that mention a given cause (effect), and the vertical axis lists different causes (effects). Each corpus is represented by a different colored dot: purple circles for analyst reports, navy blue triangles for earnings calls, and green stars for Glassdoor employee reviews. Source: Authors' creation.

and employees' day-to-day experiences in their assessments of the drivers and effects of corporate culture.

Nevertheless, there are some noteworthy differences. Business strategies, customer relations, and disruptive technologies are more frequently cited as causes of cultural change in earnings calls. Management teams, employee hiring and retention, and internal conflicts feature more prominently in employee reviews. These differences suggest that management focuses on high-level strategic or external factors as key drivers of corporate culture, while employees view people and internal factors as the primary drivers.

In terms of the effects, market share and growth and profitability are discussed much more extensively in earnings calls and analyst reports, likely reflecting management's and analysts' focus on financial performance. In contrast, employee satisfaction and internal conflicts are more salient effects of culture in Glassdoor reviews.

In summary, we find that while analysts' cultural narratives largely balance the perspectives of senior management and rank-and-file employees, they also exhibit some distinctive emphases, such as a greater focus on the integrity and risk management culture and a lesser focus on the performance-oriented and customer-oriented cultures. Studies on corporate culture have typically relied on one internal source, either employee reviews or management discussions (e.g., [Li, Mai, Shen, and Yan 2021](#); [Graham et al. 2022a, 2022b](#); [Li, Chen, and Shen 2024](#)). Clearly, these singular perspectives inherently reflect the unique vantage points and priorities of their respective stakeholder groups. The insights of equity analysts have the potential to provide a new understanding of corporate culture—a proposition that we explore in the rest of the paper.

### **3. Understanding Different Stakeholder Groups' Perspectives on Corporate Culture**

In this section, we conduct regression analyses to explore which firm and analyst characteristics are associated with analysts' coverage of corporate culture as well as firm characteristics, including governance mechanisms, that explain the divergence between different stakeholder groups' perspectives on corporate culture.

#### **3.1 Sample overview**

[Table 5](#) presents the coverage of culture-related discussions (culture types, causes, and effects) in analyst reports, earnings calls, and employee reviews. At the firm-year level, corporate culture is discussed in approximately half of the firm-years covered by the analyst reports, two-thirds of those with earnings calls, and 70 percent of those with employee reviews. Of 86,112 reports that mention culture, analysts provide both cause and effect analyses in almost 40% of those reports. Similarly, of 101,533 earnings calls in which management

**Table 5**  
**Sample overview**

Analyst reports	#report	#firm-year	#firm
Raw data	2,451,766	41,672	3,079
with culture	86,112	21,242	2,747
with cause	33,512	13,491	2,385
with effect	53,455	16,694	2,553
with either cause or effect	54,018	16,745	2,554
with both cause and effect	32,949	13,415	2,384
Earnings calls	#call	#firm-year	#firm
Raw data	243,501	72,749	12,006
with culture	101,533	48,192	10,238
with cause	58,535	34,485	8,835
with effect	80,930	41,239	9,551
with either cause or effect	82,008	41,514	9,576
with both cause and effect	57,170	34,016	8,783
Glassdoor reviews	#review	#firm-year	#firm
Raw data	5,343,864	41,969	5,187
with culture	866,796	29,081	4,485
with cause	81,154	15,998	3,240
with effect	151,689	18,959	3,508
with either cause or effect	157,680	19,153	3,527
with both cause and effect	75,163	15,576	3,200

This table reports the coverage of culture types, causes, and effects in analyst reports, earnings calls, and Glassdoor reviews. Our analyst report sample comprises 2.4 million reports over the period 2000-2020. Our earnings call sample comprises 243 thousand calls over the period 2004-2020. Our Glassdoor review sample comprises 5.3 million reviews over the period 2008-2020.

discusses culture, executives provide both cause and effect analyses in 56% of those calls. In contrast, of 866,796 employee reviews that mention culture, less than one-tenth of those reviews contain both cause and effect analyses. Moreover, employees' discussions are narrower than those of management and analysts, as they focus more on the effects of a specific culture and less on its causes.

[Table IA8](#) in the [Internet Appendix](#) provides the summary statistics for the different samples used in our analyses. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1<sup>st</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup> percentiles, and the dollar values are in 2020 dollars. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the firm-year sample. At the firm-year level, our measure of the frequency of analysts' discussions of culture, *Culture discussion*, has a mean of 0.563, suggesting that at least one analyst discusses culture in 56% of the firm-year observations. Panel B presents the summary statistics for the firm-analyst-year sample. Panels C and D present the summary statistics for the firm-year sample relating to divergence measures. [Table IA9](#) in the [Internet Appendix](#) presents the Pearson correlation matrices of the firm-year samples and the firm-analyst-year sample. An examination of the correlation matrices suggests that multicollinearity is unlikely to be an issue.

### 3.2 Firm characteristics and analysts discussing corporate culture

To examine whether and how firm characteristics are related to the likelihood of analysts discussing culture in their reports, we employ the following regression specification at the firm-year level:

$$Y_{i,t} = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Firm characteristics}_{i,t-1} + \text{Ind/Firm FE} + \text{Year FE} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \quad (1)$$

where the dependent variable is whether analysts discuss culture. Firm characteristics largely follow prior work (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015; Li, Mai, Shen, and Yan 2021; Li, Chen, and Shen 2024). We further include the number of broker or investor conferences participated in or hosted by a firm as a proxy for the extent of interaction between analysts and the firm they cover.

[Table 6](#), panel A presents the results when the dependent variable is whether a firm's analysts discuss culture. Across all of the different specifications, we find that firm size; sales growth; profitability; and major events, such as top management turnover, are positively and significantly associated with analysts discussing culture in their reports, whereas firm age and board independence are negatively and significantly associated with this variable. After controlling for time-invariant unobservable firm characteristics via firm fixed effects, we note that CEO duality, a proxy for powerful CEOs, is negatively and significantly associated with analysts discussing culture in their reports, suggesting that, under powerful CEOs, corporate culture experiences little year-to-year change, which negatively correlates with the likelihood of analysts mentioning culture in their reports. Firm characteristics—such as deal making, strong culture, and the number of interactions between analysts and a firm—lose their significant associations after including firm fixed effects.

Using a subsample of firm-year observations with culture-related segments in analyst reports, we examine the determinants of analysts discussing a specific culture type. Panel B presents the results. We first note that most firm characteristics (e.g., firm size and profitability) have consistent and significant associations with the likelihood of analysts discussing a specific culture type. We also see some interesting variations in analysts' coverage of different culture types. For example, tangibility is positively (negatively) and significantly associated with analysts discussing the customer-oriented culture (the innovation and adaptability culture), and sales growth is positively and significantly associated only with analysts discussing the collaboration and people-focused culture.

Collectively, these findings suggest that analysts are more likely to refer to corporate culture in their research when there are ample opportunities for insight (such as in large firms with greater disclosure), or when major events like management turnover or M&As are likely to affect culture.

### 3.3 Analyst characteristics and their discussions of corporate culture

To examine what analyst characteristics are associated with the likelihood of their writing about culture in reports, we employ the following regression

**Table 6**  
**Determinants of analysts discussing corporate culture in reports**

*A. Firm characteristics and analysts discussing corporate culture in their reports*

Variable	Culture discussion					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Firm size	.095*** (.004)	.091*** (.004)	.049*** (.007)	.100*** (.009)	.103*** (.011)	.095*** (.020)
ln(Firm age + 1)	-.037*** (.008)	-.029*** (.009)	-.031** (.013)	-.056** (.027)	-.064* (.033)	-.034 (.065)
Sales growth	.037*** (.014)	.041** (.016)	.126*** (.028)	.041*** (.014)	.045*** (.016)	.073** (.030)
ROA	.399*** (.047)	.382*** (.051)	.219*** (.079)	.159*** (.044)	.126** (.050)	.012 (.084)
Leverage	-.137*** (.026)	-.112*** (.028)	-.041 (.040)	-.091*** (.032)	-.077** (.036)	-.077 (.061)
Tangibility	-.073** (.030)	-.065** (.031)	-.066 (.042)	-.019 (.058)	-.042 (.065)	.248* (.128)
ROA volatility	-.162** (.067)	-.189** (.075)	-.367*** (.132)	-.053 (.067)	-.047 (.077)	-.032 (.146)
Large institutional ownership	-.040** (.016)	-.034** (.017)	-.067*** (.026)	-.005 (.017)	-.006 (.019)	-.057* (.031)
Board independence	-.158*** (.038)	-.177*** (.042)	-.313*** (.065)	-.042 (.041)	-.078* (.047)	-.176** (.075)
CEO duality	.004 (.009)	.004 (.009)	-.009 (.014)	-.020** (.009)	-.031*** (.010)	-.052*** (.017)
ln(Number of key people changes + 1)	.066*** (.005)	.050*** (.006)	.053*** (.009)	.026*** (.005)	.023*** (.005)	.022** (.009)
ln(Number of M&As + 1)	.024*** (.007)	.018** (.007)	-.002 (.011)	.001 (.006)	.001 (.007)	-.004 (.011)
Strong culture	.106*** (.011)	.064*** (.016)			.011 (.010)	.009 (.017)
ln(Number of meetings + 1)		.036*** (.008)	.018* (.010)		.007 (.008)	-.012 (.011)
Employee culture rating			.003 (.008)			.004 (.007)
ln(Number of employee reviews + 1)				.049*** (.006)		-.006 (.009)
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	NO	NO	NO
Firm FE	NO	NO	NO	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.169	.176	.181	.337	.343	.367
Observations	29,385	24,250	9,371	29,385	24,250	9,371

(Continued)

specification at the firm-analyst-year level:

$$Y_{i,j,t} = \alpha + \beta \times \text{Analyst characteristics}_{j,t-1} + \text{Firm} \times \text{Year FE} + \text{Broker FE} + \varepsilon_{i,j,t}, \quad (2)$$

where the dependent variables are whether an analyst discusses culture, the number of culture types discussed, the number of causes (effects) discussed, and her tone in discussing culture. **Table 6**, panel C presents the regression results.

Column 1 presents the regression results when the dependent variable is whether an analyst discusses culture. We show that analysts who are star analysts, CFA charter holders, women, affiliated with large brokers, who have postgraduate degrees, who have more general experience, and who make more frequent forecasts are more likely to discuss corporate culture. In contrast, analysts who follow more firms are less likely to discuss culture.

**Table 6**  
**Continued**

*B. Firm characteristics and analysts discussing a specific culture type in their reports*

Variable	Collaboration and people-focused	Customer-oriented	Innovation and adaptability	Integrity and risk management	Performance-oriented	Misc.
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Firm size	.055*** (.004)	.032*** (.003)	.063*** (.004)	.050*** (.003)	.067*** (.004)	.038*** (.003)
ln(Firm age + 1)	-.020*** (.008)	-.016*** (.006)	-.019*** (.007)	-.002 (.005)	.002 (.008)	-.007 (.005)
Sales growth	.052*** (.013)	.014 (.009)	.017 (.014)	.014 (.010)	.011 (.013)	.002 (.009)
ROA	.250*** (.039)	.180*** (.030)	.326*** (.041)	.026 (.026)	.189*** (.040)	.057** (.026)
Leverage	-.067*** (.024)	-.050*** (.017)	-.091*** (.022)	-.092*** (.016)	-.038 (.024)	-.049*** (.014)
Tangibility	-.014 (.027)	.084*** (.022)	-.110*** (.025)	-.005 (.016)	.022 (.027)	.013 (.015)
ROA volatility	-.254*** (.053)	-.014 (.037)	.001 (.059)	.044 (.033)	-.124** (.055)	.049 (.036)
Large institutional ownership	-.043*** (.014)	-.027*** (.010)	-.040*** (.014)	-.031*** (.009)	-.044*** (.014)	-.041*** (.009)
Board independence	-.135*** (.037)	-.060** (.026)	-.170*** (.034)	-.086*** (.025)	-.168*** (.037)	-.057** (.023)
CEO duality	.013 (.008)	.011* (.006)	.002 (.008)	.011* (.006)	-.001 (.008)	.001 (.005)
ln(Number of key people changes + 1)	.039*** (.005)	.019*** (.004)	.049*** (.005)	.019*** (.004)	.049*** (.005)	.026*** (.004)
ln(Number of M&As + 1)	.017** (.007)	-.002 (.005)	.024*** (.007)	.012** (.006)	.023*** (.008)	.024*** (.006)
Strong culture	.121*** (.011)	.081*** (.008)	.111*** (.010)	.021*** (.007)	.069*** (.010)	.046*** (.007)
ln(Number of meetings + 1)	.025*** (.008)	.009 (.006)	.049*** (.007)	.006 (.006)	.027*** (.008)	.014*** (.005)
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.124	.098	.142	.106	.124	.069
Observations	24,250	24,250	24,250	24,250	24,250	24,250

(Continued)

Conditional on an analyst discussing culture in her report, columns 2–5 present the regression results when the dependent variables capture the scope and depth of her culture coverage and the tone used. We note that, with some similarities to analysts who discuss corporate culture as reported above, analysts who are star analysts, CFA charter holders, who have more general or firm-specific experiences, and who make more frequent forecasts are more likely to discuss a variety of culture types in their reports. Analysts with more general experience and who are following fewer firms are associated with having more positive tones when discussing culture. The significant associations between certain analyst characteristics—star status, gender, experience, and effort—and their in-depth coverage of culture suggest that evaluating corporate culture and its link to firm value is a task that requires considerable skill (a point we explore later in the paper).

In summary, our analyses thus far suggest that generative AI models have the potential to reveal new insights into corporate culture from the vantage points of sell-side equity analysts, and that those insights differ from management's

**Table 6**  
**Continued**

C. Analyst characteristics and discussing corporate culture in reports

Variable	Culture discussion (1)	Number of types (2)	Number of causes (3)	Number of effects (4)	Tone (5)
Star analyst	.027*** (.005)	.094*** (.026)	-.010 (.018)	-.021 (.030)	-.016 (.021)
CFA	.003* (.002)	.019* (.010)	-.001 (.006)	.003 (.011)	-.005 (.008)
Postgraduate	.012*** (.002)	.010 (.009)	-.008 (.008)	.008 (.013)	.004 (.009)
Female	.017*** (.004)	.022 (.019)	.007 (.014)	-.009 (.024)	.023 (.017)
General experience	.002*** (.000)	.002* (.001)	.001 (.001)	.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)
Firm experience	-.000 (.000)	.005*** (.002)	-.001 (.001)	-.002 (.002)	.000 (.002)
Number of industries followed	-.001 (.001)	-.000 (.003)	.003 (.003)	-.002 (.005)	.009*** (.003)
Number of firms followed	-.001*** (.000)	.000 (.001)	-.002* (.001)	-.002 (.001)	-.002** (.001)
Forecast frequency	.007*** (.001)	.021*** (.003)	-.001 (.002)	-.002 (.004)	-.002 (.003)
ln(Broker size)	.009* (.005)	.024 (.031)	.008 (.027)	.030 (.045)	.024 (.030)
Local analyst	.003 (.004)	.018 (.025)	.030* (.018)	-.006 (.027)	.005 (.021)
Firm × Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Broker FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.154	.058	.046	.047	.164
No. of observations	156,598	20,150	20,150	20,150	20,150

This table examines the determinants of analysts discussing corporate culture in their reports. Panel A examines the relationships between firm characteristics and analysts discussing culture at the firm-year level. Our firm-year sample consists of 24,250 firm-year observations, representing 2,318 unique firms over the period 2002–2020. The dependent variable, *Culture discussion*, is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if corporate culture is discussed in analyst reports in a year and 0 otherwise. Panel B examines the relationships between firm characteristics and analysts discussing a specific culture type at the firm-year level. Panel C examines the relationships between analyst characteristics and them discussing culture at the firm-analyst-year level. Our firm-analyst-year sample consists of 160,332 firm-analyst-year observations (a smaller sample in regressions due to fixed effects), representing 2,471 unique firms followed by 4,096 analysts. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \* $p < .1$ , \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

and employees' perspectives. These findings beg the question of what explains those divergent perspectives on corporate culture.

### 3.4 Explaining divergent perspectives on culture held by different stakeholder groups

We next explore the determinants of the divergence between different stakeholder groups' perspectives on culture. Given the multi-dimensionality in the extracted output—culture types, causes, effects, and tones—we employ two sets of measures to capture the divergence between different stakeholder groups' views. Our first set is based on the Euclidean distance between the culture type (cause/effect/tone) vector from analyst reports and that from earnings calls (employee reviews). The measure ranges from 0 to  $\sqrt{2}$ , with

Table 7

## Determinants of divergence between different stakeholder groups' perspectives on culture

## A. Firm characteristics and divergences in viewing culture between analysts and executives or employees

Variable	Analyst–Executive	Analyst–Employee	Analyst–Executive	Analyst–Employee	Analyst–Executive	Analyst–Employee
	Type divergence	Type divergence	Cause divergence	Cause divergence	Effect divergence	Effect divergence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Firm size	-.032*** (.003)	-.030*** (.003)	-.003 (.004)	-.016*** (.004)	-.015*** (.003)	-.011*** (.004)
ln(Firm age + 1)	.013* (.007)	.014** (.006)	-.003 (.007)	.005 (.008)	-.003 (.006)	.017** (.007)
Sales growth	.026* (.016)	.000 (.014)	-.039** (.019)	-.015 (.021)	-.002 (.015)	.011 (.017)
ROA	-.070 (.057)	-.072 (.047)	.009 (.072)	.116* (.070)	-.049 (.055)	.038 (.061)
Leverage	.032 (.022)	.042** (.020)	-.029 (.025)	-.014 (.024)	-.019 (.019)	.012 (.023)
Tangibility	.023 (.024)	.030 (.021)	-.038 (.025)	.028 (.029)	.027 (.021)	.020 (.026)
ROA volatility	.247*** (.075)	.109 (.068)	.222** (.087)	.123 (.100)	.234*** (.072)	.122 (.084)
Large institutional ownership	.027* (.014)	.006 (.012)	.030* (.016)	.026 (.017)	.032** (.013)	.049*** (.014)
Board independence	.062* (.033)	.078** (.031)	.130*** (.039)	.066 (.041)	.073** (.033)	.002 (.037)
Loss year	-.011 (.012)	-.027*** (.010)	.005 (.014)	-.014 (.015)	-.003 (.011)	-.020 (.012)
CEO duality	.001 (.008)	-.001 (.007)	-.000 (.009)	-.005 (.010)	-.001 (.007)	-.006 (.008)
CEO tenure	.002*** (.001)	.000 (.001)	-.000 (.001)	.000 (.001)	.003*** (.001)	.001 (.001)
CEO Delta	.001 (.003)	-.004 (.003)	.006 (.004)	.007 (.004)	.003 (.003)	.012*** (.004)
CEO Vega	-.006** (.002)	-.002 (.002)	-.007*** (.002)	.002 (.002)	-.005** (.002)	.000 (.002)
CEO close-to-retire	-.015* (.009)	-.003 (.008)	-.004 (.010)	-.012 (.010)	-.000 (.008)	-.005 (.010)
ln(Number of meetings + 1)	-.011* (.006)	-.011** (.005)	-.006 (.008)	-.013* (.007)	-.010* (.006)	-.013** (.006)
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.120	.106	.029	.016	.062	.026
Observations	12,409	9,564	12,409	9,564	12,409	9,564

(Continued)

0 indicating identical emphasis patterns between the two sources and  $\sqrt{2}$  indicating maximum divergence in culture discussions. Our second set is the difference in frequency (tone) between analysts and management (employees) in discussing a specific culture type (culture). Table 7 presents the regression results. We make the following observations.

First, disclosure and transparency help narrow the gap between analysts and management (employees) in their assessment of corporate culture. Using

**Table 7**  
**Continued**

*B. Firm characteristics and divergences in viewing a specific culture type or tones between analysts and executives*

Variable	Analyst–Executive						
	Collaboration and people-focused	Customer-oriented	Innovation and adaptability	Integrity and risk management	Performance-oriented	Misc.	Tone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Firm size	.040*** (.005)	.022*** (.004)	.047*** (.005)	.047*** (.004)	.038*** (.005)	.047*** (.004)	-.031*** (.006)
ln(Firm age + 1)	-.016 (.010)	-.019** (.008)	.005 (.010)	.006 (.008)	.008 (.010)	-.009 (.007)	.021* (.012)
Sales growth	.006 (.020)	-.007 (.014)	.029 (.021)	.002 (.015)	-.048** (.020)	-.036** (.014)	.030 (.026)
ROA	.248*** (.079)	.111* (.065)	.248*** (.077)	.003 (.057)	.290*** (.080)	.097 (.060)	.111 (.105)
Leverage	-.036 (.031)	-.065** (.026)	-.090*** (.031)	-.050** (.024)	-.051 (.031)	-.046** (.023)	-.071* (.037)
Tangibility	-.021 (.035)	.075*** (.029)	-.056* (.033)	-.032 (.023)	-.028 (.034)	-.009 (.023)	.038 (.039)
ROA volatility	-.182** (.089)	-.074 (.060)	.027 (.095)	.145** (.060)	-.146 (.100)	.216*** (.070)	-.253** (.121)
Large institutional ownership	-.044** (.019)	-.036** (.014)	.002 (.018)	-.038*** (.014)	-.071*** (.019)	-.044*** (.013)	-.015 (.022)
Board independence	-.143*** (.046)	-.021 (.038)	-.142*** (.047)	-.110*** (.038)	-.208*** (.052)	-.027 (.036)	-.153*** (.058)
Loss year	.021 (.015)	.003 (.012)	.026* (.015)	-.001 (.011)	.049*** (.016)	.036*** (.012)	-.076*** (.019)
CEO duality	.007 (.011)	.008 (.009)	-.008 (.011)	-.006 (.009)	-.006 (.012)	-.008 (.009)	.005 (.013)
CEO tenure	-.002* (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.003*** (.001)	.001 (.001)	-.003*** (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.001 (.001)
CEO Delta	.010** (.005)	.013*** (.004)	.012** (.005)	-.001 (.004)	.007 (.005)	-.003 (.004)	.028*** (.006)
CEO Vega	.004 (.003)	.002 (.003)	.002 (.003)	.001 (.002)	.004 (.003)	.000 (.002)	-.008** (.004)
CEO close-to-retire	.017 (.012)	-.007 (.010)	.014 (.012)	.005 (.009)	.008 (.012)	.014 (.009)	-.002 (.015)
ln(Number of meetings + 1)	.020** (.009)	.008 (.007)	.013 (.009)	-.002 (.007)	.018** (.009)	.010 (.007)	.015 (.010)
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.136	.103	.126	.141	.151	.108	.270
Observations	12,409	12,409	12,409	12,409	12,409	12,409	12,409

(Continued)

the Euclidean distance measure as a summary measure of the divergence between stakeholders in perspectives in panel A, we show that firm size and the number of meetings between firms and analysts are negatively and significantly associated with the divergence between analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on culture types (causes/effects). In panel B (C), using the difference in frequency between analysts and management (employees) in discussing a specific culture type, we further show that when a firm is more transparent (as measured by size and the number of meetings between a firm and its analysts), analysts are more likely to discuss each culture type than management is (employees are).

**Table 7**  
**Continued**

C. Firm characteristics and divergences in viewing a specific culture type or tones between analysts and employees

Variable	Analyst–Employee						
	Collaboration and people-focused	Customer-oriented	Innovation and adaptability	Integrity and risk management	Performance-oriented	Misc.	Tone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Firm size	.019** (.008)	.024*** (.005)	.040*** (.005)	.052*** (.005)	.040*** (.006)	.026*** (.006)	-.007 (.007)
ln(Firm age + 1)	-.022 (.015)	-.025*** (.010)	-.010 (.011)	-.001 (.009)	.020* (.011)	-.022** (.011)	.005 (.014)
Sales growth	.076*** (.026)	-.015 (.016)	-.032 (.023)	-.023 (.017)	-.035 (.022)	-.003 (.020)	.026 (.030)
ROA	-.081 (.103)	.165** (.074)	.223*** (.078)	.006 (.063)	.147* (.087)	.014 (.081)	-.171 (.108)
Leverage	.031 (.044)	-.058* (.031)	-.072** (.034)	-.080*** (.027)	.024 (.035)	-.039 (.034)	.041 (.045)
Tangibility	-.125*** (.048)	.108*** (.035)	-.180*** (.037)	-.015 (.028)	.003 (.037)	-.032 (.036)	-.037 (.050)
ROA volatility	-.416*** (.115)	-.086 (.072)	-.004 (.099)	.192*** (.072)	-.105 (.109)	.191* (.100)	-.524*** (.139)
Large institutional ownership	-.059** (.026)	-.016 (.017)	-.033 (.021)	-.047*** (.017)	-.062*** (.022)	-.081*** (.019)	-.013 (.029)
Board independence	-.061 (.068)	-.067 (.045)	-.163*** (.054)	-.110** (.046)	-.207*** (.056)	-.050 (.050)	-.055 (.070)
Loss year	-.014 (.019)	.001 (.013)	.033** (.016)	.002 (.013)	.016 (.017)	.021 (.016)	-.079*** (.022)
CEO duality	.010 (.016)	.004 (.011)	.000 (.013)	.001 (.011)	.019 (.013)	-.002 (.012)	.021 (.017)
CEO tenure	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	-.004*** (.001)	.001 (.001)	-.003*** (.001)	-.000 (.001)	-.003*** (.001)
CEO Delta	-.014** (.007)	.010* (.005)	.012** (.005)	-.006 (.005)	-.007 (.006)	-.010* (.006)	.004 (.008)
CEO Vega	.002 (.004)	.004 (.003)	.008*** (.003)	-.000 (.003)	.005 (.003)	-.002 (.003)	.004 (.004)
CEO close-to-retire	.039** (.017)	-.007 (.012)	-.012 (.014)	.004 (.011)	-.002 (.013)	.012 (.012)	.032* (.017)
ln(Number of meetings + 1)	.004 (.011)	.009 (.008)	.034*** (.009)	-.001 (.008)	.019** (.009)	.016* (.009)	-.011 (.012)
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.085	.152	.173	.175	.114	.041	.033
Observations	9,564	9,564	9,564	9,564	9,564	9,564	9,564

This table examines the determinants of divergence between analysts' and executives' (employees') perspectives on culture. Panel A examines the relationships between firm characteristics and divergences between analysts and executives (employees) about corporate culture. Our analyst-executive firm-year sample consists of 12,409 firm-year observations, representing 2,064 unique firms over the period 2004–2020. Our analyst–employee firm-year sample consists of 9,564 firm-year observations, representing 1,805 unique firms over the period 2008–2020. The dependent variable, *Type divergence*, is the Euclidean distance between the culture types discussed by analysts and those discussed by executives (employees). *Analyst–Executive* represents the divergence between analysts and executives. *Analyst–Employee* represents the divergence between analysts and employees. Cause divergence and Effect divergence are defined analogously. Panel B examines the relationships between firm characteristics and the difference between analysts' and executives' perspectives on a specific culture type or in tones. The dependent variable, *Type (Tone) difference*, is the difference in the frequency (tones) of discussing a specific culture type by analysts and executives. Panel C examines the relationships between firm characteristics and the difference between analysts' and employees' perspectives on a specific culture type or in tones. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

Second, when there are differences in views, those differences are consistent with each stakeholder group's incentives and roles in a company. For example, using the summary measures of divergence in panel A, we show that there is more divergence between analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on culture when a firm experiences high ROA volatility. Using the difference in discussion frequency measures in panels B and C, we further note that in firms with high ROA volatility, analysts discuss more the integrity and risk management culture with a significantly negative tone than management does (employees do), which is consistent with analysts' monitoring roles. In contrast, management and employees focus more on the collaboration and people-focused culture, which could be due to their reliance on culture to navigate challenging times.

Third, there is some suggestive evidence that analysts view culture as an alternative to corporate governance to help deliver financial performance. In panel A, we show that corporate governance, as measured by both large institutional ownership and board independence, is positively and significantly associated with the divergence between analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on culture. In panels B and C, we further show that such large divergence is driven by analysts paying less attention to corporate culture than management and employees do in firms with strong governance, suggesting that analysts may view governance and culture as substitute mechanisms to achieve superior firm performance.<sup>8,9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> In [Table IA10 in the Internet Appendix](#), we explore which firm and analyst characteristics are associated with the divergence in perspectives on culture among fellow analysts. At the firm-year level, we note that firm size and ROA are negatively and significantly associated with the divergence in analysts' perspectives on the effects of culture, whereas firm age, sales growth, and ownership by large institutions are positively and significantly associated with such divergence. Moreover, we note that firm size, ROA volatility, board independence, and a CEO being close to retirement are positively and significantly associated with the divergence in tones among analysts about culture, whereas CEO equity incentives and the number of meetings between analysts and firms are negatively and significantly associated with such divergence. At the firm-analyst-year level, controlling for firm  $\times$  year fixed effects and broker fixed effects, we note that analysts with a postgraduate degree or analysts following more industries are negatively and significantly associated with the divergence in tones among analysts about culture, whereas analysts following more firms are positively and significantly associated with such divergence. At the firm-analyst-year level, using the difference in discussion frequency on a specific culture type or in tone, we see that education, gender, scope of industry and firm coverage, and proximity to a followed firm matter to a degree. Overall, it seems that after removing time-varying firm characteristics (with the firm  $\times$  year fixed effects) and time-invariant broker effects, few analyst characteristics can explain inter-analyst differences in perspectives on culture.

<sup>9</sup> We conduct some exploratory analyses of the consequences of the divergence between analysts' and management's (employees') cultural views. The dependent variables are firm performance measures 1 year and 3 years out. The variables of interest are the analysts' tones in discussing culture, the interaction term between the standalone tone and the divergence in tones between analysts and management (employees) in discussing culture, and the divergence in tones. [Table IA11 in the Internet Appendix](#) presents the results. In panel A, columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) show that analysts' tones in discussing culture are consistently, positively, and significantly associated with future firm performance measures and that the divergence in tones between analysts and management mitigates such positive associations to some extent. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) repeat the analysis, controlling for analysts' tones in sections of their reports that do not discuss culture. Our main findings remain. In panel B, columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) show that analysts' tones in discussing culture are consistently, positively, and significantly associated with future firm performance measures, and that the interaction term between analysts' tones and the divergence in tones between analysts and employees are largely statistically insignificant. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) repeat the analyses, controlling for analysts' tones in

Taken as a whole, our results suggest that the divergence between analysts' and management's (employees') perspectives on corporate culture reflects their distinct vantage points and economic and governance incentives. We hope our exploratory analyses in this section will help generate future research on the role of corporate culture from the perspectives of a broad set of corporate stakeholder groups.

#### 4. Analysts' Perspectives on Corporate Culture and Stock Price Implications

Prior studies show that analysts' fundamental research contributes to stock price formation (see, for example, [Womack 1996](#); [Brav and Lehavy 2003](#); [Loh and Stulz 2011](#); [Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014](#); [Kecskés, Michaely, and Womack 2017](#); [Li et al. Forthcoming](#)). In this section, we examine whether and how analysts' perspectives on culture impact price formation. Our analysis is at the report level. [Section C of the Internet Appendix](#) describes how we match reports from Investext in our sample to the I/B/E/S forecast data.

##### 4.1 Analysts' perspectives on corporate culture and their research output

To examine the relationship between analysts' perspectives on culture and their research output, we focus on stock recommendations and target prices because both measures capture a firm's long-term prospects (e.g., [Brav and Lehavy 2003](#); [Loh and Stulz 2011](#); [Li et al. Forthcoming](#)); these prospects align well with the role of corporate culture in long-term value creation (e.g., [Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015](#); [Li, Liu, Mai, and Zhang 2021](#)). Moreover, a strong culture could, over time, boost a firm's cash flows or lower its discount rate; either or both outcomes would be reflected in stock recommendations and target prices. Given the importance of sentiment in textual data (see, for example, [Antweiler and Frank 2004](#); [Tetlock 2007](#); [Loughran and McDonald 2011](#); [Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014](#)), the key variable of interest is GPT-4o's classification of analysts' tones in culture-related segments, *Tone*. We also explore whether an analyst's more in-depth culture analysis involving causes and effects could affect her research output. We further control for tones in the remainder of a report, *Nonculture tone*. [Table 8](#), panel A presents the summary statistics for the key variables. We note that the mean (median) number of causes and effects discussed in a report is 1.4 (2.0). Other statistics are largely consistent with the literature (e.g., [Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang 2013](#); [Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014](#); [Kecskés, Michaely, and Womack 2017](#)). Panel B presents the regression results. We include firm  $\times$  year and analyst fixed

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sections of their reports that do not discuss culture. We note that analysts' tones in the nonculture sections of their reports are positively and significantly associated with future firm performance measures, whereas analysts' tones in discussing culture are no longer significant.

effects to control for time-varying unobservable firm characteristics that may affect analysts' coverage decisions and for analysts' innate skills or preferences relating to their discussions of corporate culture, respectively.

We show that *Tone* is positively and significantly associated with stock recommendations and target prices, suggesting that analysts' sentiments on culture play a significant role in their stock recommendations and target price forecasts. Table IA12 columns 1–2 run a horse race using three different tone measures: GPT-based tone (*Tone*), FinBERT-based tone (*FinBERT tone*, Huang, Wang, and Yang 2023), and bag-of-words-based tone (*LM tone*, Loughran and McDonald 2011). Although our GPT-based *Tone* measure is positively correlated with *FinBERT tone* (*correlation* = 0.51) and *LM tone* (*correlation* = 0.37), columns 1–2 in Table IA12 indicate that our measure possesses incremental explanatory power. When all three measures are included in the regression, the coefficient on the GPT-based *Tone* is consistently the largest in magnitude and remains highly significant in explaining stock recommendations and target prices. This result implies that the information content of the dictionary-based *LM tone* is subsumed. While *FinBERT tone* retains some explanatory power, its attenuated association suggests that GPT can extract more value-relevant sentiment from analysts' narratives.

In terms of economic significance, a change in *Tone* from negative to neutral (or from neutral to positive) is associated with a 12.7 percentage point increase in the (linear) probability of analysts upgrading their recommendations and a 2.0 percentage point increase in target price forecast relative to the mean.<sup>10</sup> Moreover, the above effect is further substantiated if the report also contains a culture-related cause (effect) analysis. The coefficient on the interaction term *Tone*  $\times$  *Number of cause and effect* is positive and significant at the 5% or lower level in columns 2 and 4. In terms of economic significance, a one-standard-deviation increase in the number of culture causes and effects mentioned in a report is associated with a 2.1 percentage point increase in the probability of a stock recommendation upgrade and a 0.42 percentage point increase in the target price forecast relative to the mean.<sup>11</sup>

For comparison, a change in *Nonculture tone* from negative to neutral (or from neutral to positive) is associated with a 56.2 percentage point increase in the (linear) probability of analysts upgrading their recommendations and a 9.2 percentage point increase in the target price forecast relative to the mean.<sup>12</sup> Given that the nonculture segments regarding a firm's financial performance

<sup>10</sup> The 12.7 percentage point increase is calculated from  $1 \times 0.127 \times 100$ , and the 2.0 percentage point increase is calculated from  $1 \times 0.024 \times 100/1.173$  where the denominator 1.173 is the sample average target price relative to the mean.

<sup>11</sup> The 2.1 percentage point increase is calculated from  $1.225 \times 0.017 \times 100$ , and the 0.42 percentage point increase is calculated from  $1.225 \times 0.004 \times 100/1.173$  where the denominator 1.173 is the sample average target price relative to the mean.

<sup>12</sup> The 56.2 percentage point increase is calculated from  $1 \times 0.562 \times 100$ , and the 9.2 percentage point increase is calculated from  $1 \times 0.108/1.173$ .

**Table 8****Analysts' perspectives on corporate culture and their research output****A. Summary statistics for the key variables**

	Mean	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Median	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	SD
<b>Stock recommendation sample</b>					
Recommendation	.734	.000	1.000	1.000	.853
Tone	.504	.000	1.000	1.000	.681
Number of cause and effect	1.432	.000	2.000	2.000	1.225
<b>Target price sample</b>					
Target price	1.173	1.045	1.167	1.286	.218

**B. The tone in culture-related segments, stock recommendations, and target prices**

Variable	Recommendation	Recommendation	Target price	Target price
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Tone	.127*** (.011)	.102*** (.014)	.024*** (.003)	.019*** (.003)
Tone × Number of cause and effect		.017*** (.006)		.004** (.001)
Number of cause and effect		-.012** (.005)		-.003** (.001)
Nonculture tone	.562*** (.029)	.560*** (.029)	.108*** (.008)	.108*** (.008)
ln(Report length)	.000 (.013)	.001 (.013)	-.004 (.003)	-.004 (.003)
Star analyst	-.014 (.037)	-.014 (.037)	-.004 (.008)	-.004 (.008)
Female	.010 (.044)	.011 (.044)	-.011 (.008)	-.011 (.008)
Forecast horizon	-.099** (.039)	-.099** (.039)	.002 (.008)	.002 (.008)
General experience	-.001 (.003)	-.001 (.003)	-.000 (.000)	-.000 (.000)
Firm experience	.002 (.003)	.002 (.003)	.002** (.001)	.002** (.001)
Number of industries followed	.031*** (.008)	.031*** (.008)	.001 (.002)	.001 (.002)
Number of firms followed	-.004* (.002)	-.004* (.002)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Forecast frequency	-.002 (.005)	-.002 (.005)	-.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)
ln(Broker size)	-.175*** (.017)	-.176*** (.017)	-.014*** (.003)	-.014*** (.003)
Firm × Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Analyst FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.457	.457	.423	.423
No. of observations	28,903	28,903	29,169	29,169

This table examines the relationships between analysts' perspectives on corporate culture and their stock recommendations and target prices at the report level. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the key variables. Panel B examines the relationships between analysts' tones in culture-related segments and their stock recommendations and target prices. The dependent variable in columns 1–2, *Recommendation*, is a report's stock recommendation using a five-tier rating system. The dependent variable in columns 3–4, *Target price*, is a report's target price divided by the stock price 50 days before the report date (in percentage points). Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at the firm and analyst levels.

\* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

are more directly related to stock recommendations and target price forecasts, the effect of culture-related *Tone* is noteworthy.

In summary, we show that, compared to those with only passing mentions of culture, analysts with a deeper understanding of culture (ie, they discuss the causes or effects of culture) incorporate more of such analysis in their research output. This finding suggests that analysts' detailed "cause and effect" analyses contain value-relevant information.

## 4.2 The information content of analysts' perspectives on corporate culture

To investigate the information content of analysts' perspectives on corporate culture in reports, we employ an event study relating three-day cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the report date to measures of analysts' perspectives on culture, controlling for quantitative and qualitative summary measures of a report (e.g., the tone in the rest of the report and report length), and analyst and firm characteristics (Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014; Huang et al. 2018). Table 9, panel A presents the summary statistics of the key variables used. Panel B presents the regression results.

In column 1, we show that *Tone* is positively and significantly associated with  $CAR[-1,+1]$ , suggesting that culture discussions in a report provide information beyond its quantitative and qualitative measures. Table IA12 column 3 runs a horse race using three different tone measures—*Tone*, *FinBERT tone*, and *LM tone*—to explain market reactions. Consistent with the results for analyst research output, the information content of the dictionary-based *LM tone* is subsumed by that of the two alternative measures from the more advanced models. In this context, both GPT-based *Tone* and *FinBERT tone* are positively and significantly associated with abnormal returns. Importantly, we find that the market reaction depends not only on an analyst's sentiment but also on the analytical depth she provides. After adding the interaction term *Tone*  $\times$  *High number of cause and effect* in column 2, the standalone term *Tone* loses its significance. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. In other words, the market reacts significantly to an analyst's tone in discussing culture only when the number of culture causes and effects mentioned in her report is the highest among her peers.

In terms of economic significance, a change in *Tone* from negative to neutral (or from neutral to positive) by an analyst who provides the most cause-and-effect discussion relative to her peers is associated with an additional three-day abnormal return of 44.9 basis points around the report date, corresponding to an \$155.7 million increase in market value for an average firm in the sample.<sup>13</sup> For comparison, a change in *Nonculture tone* from negative to

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<sup>13</sup> The 44.9 basis points increase is calculated from  $0.449 \times 1 \times 100$ , and the \$155.7 million increase in market value of equity is calculated from  $0.449\% \times \$34.7$  billion, where \$34.7 billion is the sample average market capitalization.

**Table 9**  
**Information content of analysts' perspectives on corporate culture**  
*A. Summary statistics for the key variables*

	Mean	25 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	Median	75 <sup>th</sup> Percentile	SD
CAR[-1,+1] (%)	.126	-1.601	.075	1.953	4.516
Tone	.497	.000	1.000	1.000	.688
Nonculture tone	.203	.026	.200	.385	.269
High number of cause and effect	.369	.000	.000	1.000	.483
Analyst–executive divergence	.000	-.255	.003	.240	.366
Analyst–employee divergence	.000	-.198	.023	.214	.322
Analyst–other divergence	.000	-.187	.019	.180	.284

*B. Price reactions to analyst reports*

Variable	CAR[-1,+1]				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Tone	.258*** (.070)	.103 (.083)	.048 (.100)	.177* (.105)	.044 (.112)
Tone × High number of cause and effect		.449*** (.146)			
High number of cause and effect		-.337** (.138)			
Tone × Analyst–executive divergence			.521* (.275)		
Analyst–executive divergence				-.427* (.255)	-.572
Tone × Analyst–employee divergence					.733** (.285)
Analyst–employee divergence					-.185 (.264)
Tone × Analyst–other divergence					.955** (.426)
Analyst–other divergence					-.572 (.387)
Nonculture tone	2.235*** (.176)	2.312*** (.181)	1.821*** (.212)	2.001*** (.271)	1.957*** (.278)
ln(Report length)	.071 (.062)	.019 (.065)	.112 (.079)	.092 (.090)	.114 (.092)
Earnings forecast revision	22.340*** (6.671)	21.217*** (7.377)	2.500*** (7.840)	25.912** (1.593)	27.154** (1.773)
Recommendation revision	1.773*** (.263)	1.911*** (.271)	2.207*** (.360)	2.275*** (.453)	2.146*** (.464)
Target price revision	.162*** (.035)	.133*** (.036)	.134*** (.039)	.141*** (.042)	.135*** (.043)
Prior CAR	-.026** (.010)	-.028** (.011)	-.022* (.011)	-.028** (.014)	-.027* (.014)
Other analyst/firm controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	.050	.053	.043	.051	.048
No. of observations	14,592	13,367	9,763	6,295	6,027

This table examines the information content of analysts' perspectives on corporate culture at the report level. The sample comprises 14,592 reports that contain culture discussions and are not issued at the same time as any other earnings announcements. Panel A presents the summary statistics for the key variables. Panel B presents the regression results. The dependent variable,  $CAR[-1,+1]$ , is the cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) centered around the report date (day 0) based on a market model. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are double-clustered at the firm and analyst levels. \* $p < .1$ ; \*\* $p < .05$ ; \*\*\* $p < .01$ .

neutral (or from neutral to positive) is associated with an additional three-day abnormal return of 224 basis points, corresponding to a \$775 million increase in market value for an average firm in the sample.<sup>14</sup> It is worth noting that the effect documented above is the direct information effect of analysts' perspectives on culture in reports and that there are also indirect effects via stock recommendation and target price revisions, as shown in Table 8.

Furthermore, we find that the market places a premium on analysts' independent and differentiated views. In columns 3, 4, and 5, we explore potential heterogeneous effects when an analyst's view of culture diverges from that of management, employees, or both by including the interaction term *Tone*  $\times$  *Analyst-executive divergence*, *Analyst-employee divergence*, or *Analyst-other divergence*, respectively. Compared to column 1, the standalone term *Tone* loses its significance. In contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and significant. In other words, the market reacts significantly to an analyst's tone on culture only when her view of culture differs from that of management (employees or both). Using column 5 as an example, a change in *Tone* from negative to neutral (or from neutral to positive) by an analyst whose culture discussion is one standard deviation away from those of management and employees is associated with an additional three-day abnormal return of 27.1 basis points around the release date of her report, corresponding to a \$94.1 million increase in market value.<sup>15</sup>

We conclude that analysts' research on corporate culture contributes to price formation, particularly when analysts fulfill their information discovery role by offering in-depth causal reasoning or providing an independent, external assessment that diverges from firms' internal narratives. We are the first to highlight the price implications of corporate culture through the lens of equity analysts.

## 5. Conclusion

Our study is among the first in finance, accounting, and economics to apply generative AI models as reasoning agents on analyst reports, earnings call transcripts, and employee reviews to gain insights into different stakeholder groups' perspectives on corporate culture and to explore the link between corporate culture and price formation.

Generative AI organizes different stakeholders' perspectives on culture into a knowledge graph that links different cultural values to their perceived causes and effects. We show that both analysts and management consider the innovation and adaptability, collaboration and people-focused, and

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<sup>14</sup> The 224 basis points increase is calculated from  $1 \times 2.235 \times 100$ , and the \$775 million increase in market value of equity is calculated from  $2.24\% \times \$34.7$  billion.

<sup>15</sup> The 27.1 basis points increase is calculated from  $0.955 \times 0.284 \times 100$ , where 0.284 is the standard deviation of *Analyst-other divergence* in our sample. The \$94.1 million increase in market value of equity is calculated from  $0.271\% \times \$34.7$  billion where \$34.7 billion is the sample average market capitalization.

performance-oriented cultures as the most important to them. In contrast, employees view the collaboration and people-focused culture as the most important to them. Moreover, both analysts and management believe that business strategy is the most important driver for cultural changes, whereas employees view the management team as primarily responsible for cultural changes. In terms of culture's effects, both analysts and management believe market share and growth as the most important outcome of firms with a strong culture, whereas employees view their own satisfaction as the most important outcome. These systematic differences align with the distinct roles and different incentives of each stakeholder group. They also provide evidence of our approach's effectiveness in distinguishing between different stakeholder groups' perspectives on corporate culture. Additionally, our study explores the different firm and analyst characteristics associated with analysts analyzing culture in their research, as well as the different firm and governance characteristics associated with the divergence in perspectives on culture between different stakeholder groups.

Finally, we show that analysts' perspectives on corporate culture are reflected in their stock recommendations and target price forecasts, especially when analysts possess more in-depth understanding of culture as shown by the number of causes and effects mentioned in their reports. Moreover, we show that the market reacts significantly to analysts' discussion of culture, especially when an analyst has a far better understanding of culture than her peers or when an analyst's view of culture differs from that of management (employees or both). We conclude that analysts' research on corporate culture offers new insights into its causes and effects and that we are closer to establishing the culture-firm value link.

Our paper highlights the great potential of generative AI in extracting cause–effect relationships and offers a roadmap for applying generative AI to finance and accounting research.

**Code Availability:** The replication code is available in the Harvard Dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/SGHZJ8>

## Appendix. Variable Definitions

All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1<sup>st</sup> and 99<sup>th</sup> percentiles. All dollar values are in 2020 dollars.

**Table A1**

Variable	Definition
<b>Firm-year level</b>	
(Analyst–Employee) Collaboration and people-focused	The difference in frequency between analysts' and employees' discussions of the collaboration and people-focused culture, computed as the difference in the share of analyst reports discussing this culture type and the share of employee reviews discussing this culture type over the past three years. Other univariate difference measures are defined analogously.
(Analyst–Executive) Collaboration and people-focused	The difference in frequency between analysts' and managements' discussions of the collaboration and people-focused culture, computed as the difference in the share of analyst reports discussing this culture type and the share of earnings calls discussing this culture type over the past three years. Other univariate difference measures are defined analogously.
Board independence	The share of independent directors on a board.
Brand value	The value of a company's brands (in millions of dollars). The data are from Refinitiv ESG.
CEO close-to-retire	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a CEO is > 61 years old and 0 otherwise. The data are from ExecuComp.
CEO Delta	The change in the dollar value of a CEO's wealth per one-percentage-point change in stock price (Guay 1999). The data are from ExecuComp.
CEO duality	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a CEO is also Chairperson of the Board and 0 otherwise.
CEO tenure	The number of years a CEO is in office. The data are from ExecuComp.
CEO Vega	The change in the dollar value of a CEO's wealth for a 0.01 change in the annualized standard deviation of stock returns (Guay 1999). The data are from ExecuComp.
Collaboration and people-focused	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the collaboration and people-focused culture is discussed in analyst reports in a year and 0 otherwise. Other culture type–specific indicators (e.g., customer-oriented) are defined analogously.
Consumer complaints	The number of times a company is in the media spotlight due to consumer complaints or dissatisfaction directly linked to its products or services. The data are from Refinitiv ESG.
Culture discussion	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if corporate culture is discussed in analyst reports in a year and 0 otherwise.
Employee culture rating	The average of employee ratings of culture and values (1–5) from all (i.e., current and former) employees in a year. The data are from Glassdoor.
Employee overall rating	The average of employee overall ratings of their workplace (1–5) from all (i.e., current and former) employees in a year. The data are from Glassdoor.
Firm age	The number of years since a firm first appears in Compustat.
Firm size	The natural logarithm of total assets.
Large institutional ownership	The fraction of shares outstanding held by institutional investors with at least 5% of firm ownership. Missing values are assigned zero.
Leverage	The book value of debt divided by total assets.
Loss year	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm has a negative ROA in a year and 0 otherwise.
Number of employee reviews	The number of all (i.e., current and former) employees providing culture and values ratings in a year. The data are from Glassdoor.
Number of key people changes	The number of top executive and board member changes in a year. The data are from Capital IQ Key Developments database.
Number of M&As	The number of announcements related to M&As in a year. The data are from Capital IQ Key Developments database.
Number of meetings	The sum of the number of investor meetings organized by a firm and the number of broker-held meetings that a firm is invited to attend in a year. Investor meetings include analyst or investor day (with a key development id of 192) and shareholder or analyst calls (with a key development id of 50). Broker-held meetings are company conference presentations (with a key development id of 51). The data are from Capital IQ Key Developments database.
Number of types (causes or effects)	The number of culture types (causes or effects of culture) discussed in analyst reports in a year.
Patents	The number of newly granted patents to a firm in a year. The data are from Kogan et al. (2017).
R&D spending	R&D expenses divided by total assets.
Restatement	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm later restates its (annual or quarterly) financial statements and 0 otherwise. The data come from Audit Analytics.

(Continued)

**Table A1**  
(Continued)

Variable	Definition
ROA	Operating income before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
ROA volatility	The standard deviation of annual ROA, calculated over the past three years, multiplied by one hundred.
Sales growth	One-year sales changes divided by last year sales.
Strong culture	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if a firm's cultural score is above the top quartile in a year and 0 otherwise. A firm's cultural score is the sum of five cultural values (innovation, integrity, quality, respect, and teamwork), extracted from earnings conference calls in a year. The data are from <a href="#">Li et al. (2021)</a> .
Tangibility	Net property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets.
Tone	The average tone of the culture-related segments in analyst reports in a year. GPT classifies each segment as negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (1).
Type (Cause/Effect/Tone) divergence	For each firm-year observation, we construct vectors representing the share of mentions for each culture type (cause/effect/tone) in analyst reports (earnings calls/employee reviews) over the past three years, with six elements for culture types (eighteen for causes, seventeen for effects, and three for tones). Let A and M represent these vectors for analysts and management (employees). We compute the measure the Euclidean distance $\sqrt{\sum(A_i - M_i)^2}$ , where $i$ indexes culture type (cause/effect/tone) elements in each vector. The measure ranges from 0 to $\sqrt{2}$ , with 0 indicating identical emphasis patterns between two sources and $\sqrt{2}$ indicating maximum divergence in culture discussions.
Total assets	The book value of total assets (in millions of dollars).
Workforce score	A score measuring a company's effectiveness regarding job satisfaction, a healthy and safe workplace, maintaining diversity and equal opportunities, and providing development opportunities for its workforce. The data are from Refinitiv ESG.
<b>Firm-analyst-year level</b>	
Broker size	The natural logarithm of the number of analysts making at least one forecast at a given broker.
CFA	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an analyst is a CFA charter holder and 0 otherwise.
Culture discussion	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if corporate culture is discussed by an analyst in her reports in a firm-year and 0 otherwise.
Female	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an analyst is a female and 0 otherwise.
Firm experience	The number of years for which an analyst makes at least one forecast of a given firm.
Forecast frequency	The number of forecasts that an analyst makes of a given firm.
Forecast horizon	The average of the forecast horizons (in terms of the number of years based on Forecast Period Indicator in I/B/E/S) that an analyst produces when making forecasts in a firm-year.
General experience	The number of years for which an analyst makes at least one forecast of any firm.
Local analyst	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an analyst is based in an office that is within driving distance from a focal firm's headquarters (100 miles) and 0 otherwise. The data for the analyst office address are from Capital IQ. The data for firm headquarters address are sourced from firms' SEC 10-X filing headers. To determine the coordinates (latitudes and longitudes) of both addresses, we use Google Map API. We then calculate the distance between analyst office and corporate headquarters using the Haversine formula.
Number of firms followed	The number of firms for which an analyst makes at least one forecast.
Number of industries followed	The number of two-digit SIC industries in which an analyst makes at least one forecast of any firm in that industry.
Number of types (causes/effects)	The number of culture types (causes/effects of culture) discussed by an analyst in her reports in a firm-year.
Postgraduate	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an analyst possesses a postgraduate degree and 0 otherwise.
Star analyst	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if an analyst is accredited to All-America research team status and 0 otherwise.
Tone	The average tone of culture-related segments in an analyst's reports in a firm-year.

(Continued)

**Table A1**  
**(Continued)**

Variable	Definition
<b>Report-level</b>	
Analyst–employee divergence	The Euclidean distance between the perspective of an analyst report and the perspective of employees on a firm’s culture. The report’s perspective is represented by a vector summarizing its discussion patterns. The employees’ perspective is represented by a vector summarizing their discussion patterns across all reviews over the past three years. Each vector is constructed by first separately calculating the relative emphasis on different culture types, causes, effects, and tones and then combining these four components into a single summary vector. A high value indicates greater disagreement between an analyst and employees in their characterization of a firm’s culture. The measure ranges from 0 to $\sqrt{8}$ , and we use the demeaned version in regressions to facilitate interpretation.
Analyst–executive divergence	The Euclidean distance between the perspective of an analyst report and the perspective of executives on a firm’s culture. Each perspective vector is constructed in a manner analogous to that of the <i>Analyst–employee divergence</i> measure.
Analyst–other divergence	The average of <i>Analyst–executive divergence</i> and <i>Analyst–employee divergence</i> .
CAR[-1,+1]	The cumulative three-day abnormal return (in percentage points) centered around the report date (day 0) based on a market model in which the market portfolio is the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) value-weighted market index.
Earnings forecast revision	The earnings forecast in a report minus the last earnings forecast in I/B/E/S issued by the same analyst for the same firm, divided by the stock price 50 days before the report date.
FinBERT tone	The average tone of the culture-related segments in a report using the pretrained FinBERT-tone model (Huang, Wang, and Yang 2023). Each segment is assigned a tone of negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (1) based on the model’s highest probability output across the three categories.
High number of cause and effect	An indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if the number of culture causes and effects mentioned in an analyst’s reports in the year prior is the highest among her peer analysts discussing culture and 0 otherwise.
LM tone	The average tone of culture-related segments in a report using the sentiment word list from Loughran and McDonald (2011). A segment’s tone is classified as negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (1) if its word-count polarity score is negative, zero, or positive, respectively.
Nonculture tone	The average tone of nonculture-related segments in a report. FinBERT classifies each segment as negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (1).
Number of cause and effect	The number of causes and effects of culture in a report.
Prior CAR	Cumulative 10-day abnormal return (in percentage points) ending 2 trading days before the report date based on a market model in which the market portfolio is the CRSP value-weighted market index.
Recommendation	The stock recommendation in a report using a 5-tier rating system where 2 represents “strong buy,” 1 represents “buy,” 0 represents “hold,” -1 represents “underperform,” and -2 represents “sell.”
Recommendation revision	The recommendation in a report minus the last recommendation in I/B/E/S issued by the same analyst for the same firm.
Report length	The natural logarithm of the number of segments in a report.
Target price	The target price in a report divided by the stock price 50 days before the report date, following Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014).
Target price revision	The target price in a report minus the last target price in I/B/E/S issued by the same analyst for the same firm, divided by the stock price 50 days before the report date.
Tone	The average tone of culture-related segments in a report. GPT classifies each segment as negative (-1), neutral (0), or positive (1).

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# Internet Appendix for

## “Dissecting Corporate Culture Using Generative AI”

### A. Technical Appendix

In this appendix, we describe technical details of how we preprocess analyst reports, remove boilerplate segments, identify culture-related segments via word sense disambiguation, a machine learning model (BERT), and Open AI’s GPT-4o model, and implement canonicalization of culture types and causes/effects. Figure 1 provides a flowchart of our information extraction method.

#### 1. Converting Reports from PDF to Text

We download 2,434,782 reports over the period 2000–2020 from Thomson One’s Investext database. The reports are in PDF format. We use GROBID (<https://github.com/kermitt2/grobid>), an open-source software, to extract structured information from PDF documents and transform this information into XML documents. The XML documents are then stripped of information identified as tables, annexes, notes, and author information; the main content is converted to plain text. We further split text into sentences using OpenNLP’s sentence segment module, a built-in function in GROBID.

#### 2. Segment Chunking

An inherent challenge resulting from the conversion process described above is the loss of paragraph structure in reports. Moreover, even if the structure could have been maintained, differentiating between headers, bullet points, and coherent paragraphs in a report is not straightforward.

To address these issues, we employ the C99 algorithm, a common text segmentation technique developed by Choi (2000). The C99 algorithm is a domain-independent, unsupervised method for linear text segmentation. Its defining principle is that topics in a text document are coherent, and topic shifts can be identified by a sharp decline in coherence. The algorithm quantifies coherence through pairwise similarity of sentences. It builds a matrix of cosine similarities between bag-of-words representations of sentences in a document, where each sentence is represented as a vector of word counts. The algorithm then computes local similarity rankings within a sliding window and uses dynamic programming to identify optimal segmentation points where there are significant drops in coherence. The C99 algorithm enables us to coalesce individual sentences into larger, more meaningful segments that align more closely with coherent thoughts or ideas in the text. Consequently, we use these segmented units, rather than individual sentences, as the unit of analysis for our study.

#### 3. Removing Boilerplate Segments

To identify and remove boilerplate segments in analyst reports, we employ a machine learning model specifically designed and trained for this purpose.

To construct the training data set for our model, we first identify the top 20 brokers producing the highest volume of reports each year. From each of those brokers in each sample year, we sample 1,000 of their reports. We then identify the top 10% most frequently repeated segments within those reports. For a segment to be classified as a positive example, it must satisfy two criteria: it is among the top 10% most frequently repeated segments, and it is repeated at least five times by the same broker within the same year.

Negative examples, or segments least likely to be boilerplates, are identified by randomly selecting 10 segments with no repetition in each broker-year sample. To ensure balance within our data set, we

randomly sample from the remaining non-boilerplate segments to achieve a one-to-ten ratio of positive to negative examples. This results in a training data set of 547,790 examples, comprising 54,779 positive examples of boilerplate segments and 493,011 negative examples of non-boilerplate segments. The data set is split into training, validation, and testing sets, using an 80/10/10 ratio.

Our approach to identifying boilerplate segments in reports makes use of the SentenceTransformer model, specifically the all-mpnet-base-v2 variant. This model builds on an architecture similar to BERT, but focuses on creating high-quality sentence-level embeddings instead of token-level embeddings. This is particularly beneficial for our task as it views sentences and segments as distinct units of meaning, and thereby generates more effective and contextually relevant embeddings. To generate these embeddings, the SentenceTransformer model employs a mean pooling operation on the output of the transformer network, i.e., it creates a fixed-length sentence embedding by averaging all token embeddings. This operation gives us a representation of each sentence in a 768-dimensional vector space. For a segment containing multiple sentences, we compute the mean of all the sentence embeddings within that segment to yield a representative vector. This is an essential step because it allows us to convert segments of varying lengths into fixed-length representations, which can then be directly fed into our classification model. We find that this simple aggregation method performs well in capturing the overall semantic context of a segment.

BERT, with its bi-directional context understanding, is known to be effective for a broad range of NLP tasks (Devlin et al. 2018). A standard practice is to fine-tune the pre-trained BERT model on a specific task, which adjusts all the model parameters. This approach typically achieves high performance as it enables the pre-trained BERT model to learn from the specifics of the task, capitalizing on its general language understanding capabilities while adapting to task-specific nuances. However, given the context of our research, we adopt a different strategy that leverages both the representation power of the pre-trained BERT model and the efficiency of a classification head. Rather than fine-tuning and adjusting all parameters of the model, we freeze the parameters of the BERT model (i.e., the embeddings are fixed) and add a classification head to the model. The classification head takes embeddings from the BERT model as inputs and processes them with two hidden layers: the first layer contains 16 neurons, and the second layer contains 8 neurons. Each layer applies a Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) activation to introduce non-linearity. Following the processing of the embeddings by the two layers, the resulting output vector is directed towards a softmax layer, which computes the probability of each segment as boilerplate or not.

The choice of the above strategy (architecture) is motivated by a number of considerations. First, our main generative AI model leverages retrieval augmented generation (RAG) that uses the all-mpnet-base-v2 embedding to help retrieve more context for culture-related information extraction. The chosen architecture allows us to maintain the consistency of embeddings across models. Second, we find that identifying boilerplate text is a relatively straightforward task that does not require the full-scale fine-tuning of the model, which would be computationally expensive and time-consuming. By freezing the parameters of the segment representation model and deploying only the classification head, we optimize computational efficiency and streamline the training process.

The trained classification model achieves good performance, with an Area Under the Curve (AUC) of 0.966 on the test set. The false positive rate is 0.093 and the false negative rate is 0.073.

Table IA1 in the Internet Appendix lists predicted boilerplate probabilities and boilerplate examples, sorted by decile. We retain segments with a boilerplate probability of 0.22 (the sample median) or lower.

#### 4. Identifying Culture-related Segments

We identify segments related to corporate culture through a three-step procedure.

In step 1, we start with an exhaustive text search using two sets of keywords. The initial set of keywords is based on the word set explicitly about corporate culture, identifying a total of 5,541 relevant segments.<sup>16</sup> We also employ a second, more flexible set of keywords, which match all segments containing the word “culture(s)” or “cultural,” excluding those already identified to avoid duplication. This second search results in a larger set of 46,795 segments. These segments contain potentially relevant mentions of corporate culture, although their meaning could be ambiguous. The word “culture(s),” and to a lesser extent the word “cultural,” may refer to biological or social context.

To address these ambiguities, we employ generative AI for word sense disambiguation (WSD). Table IA2 Panel A shows the prompt. Our method matches the word “culture(s)” or “cultural” with one of the three definitions from dictionary.com.<sup>17</sup> The following examples illustrate our application of WSD:

1. *“Organization structure, talent model and deep bench of UNH make for a strong competitive advantage. The passion for excellence, humility, restlessness and desire to win is a culture that keeps UNH at the top of its game, and we expect will make it hard for fast-followers in the Large Cap MCO space and new Big Tech entrants such as AMZN and AAPL to catch up.”* -> Organizational
2. *“Demand for specialty proteins, probiotics, and cultures supported pricing gains. Continued strength in demand should contribute to a 1% and 4% YoY increase in sales for 1Q14 and 2014, respectively.”* -> Biological
3. *“Cultural hurdles more relative than price. There’s no question that web conferencing is significantly less expensive than face-to-face meetings that require corporate travel (although it doesn’t always replace a face-to-face meeting). To our knowledge, no one is questioning the value proposition of web conferencing.”* -> Societal

We exclude segments in which the discussion of culture is classified as in a biological or societal context, resulting in a final set of 41,038 segments.

It is possible that there are segments about corporate culture without mentioning explicit words or phrases. Consider the following segment *“One word we have heard from BBY’s management team, a word that has led to the highest service levels at retailers and often the most successful ones is empowerment. From Wal-Mart in its heyday to Home Depot to Costco to Bed Bath and Beyond, empowering employees has been a critical element to success among retailers.”* This segment, while not mentioning ‘culture,’ a human reader will conclude that it discusses a key aspect of corporate culture: employee empowerment.

In step 2, we fine-tune a BERT model to identify culture-related segments that lack specific keywords. The construction of our training set involves using segments, identified in step 1 as containing relevant keywords, as positive examples (culture = 1). Conversely, we include randomly selected segments without those keywords as negative examples (culture = 0). This training set is used to fine-tune the model, which is then deployed across all segments (excluding those identified in step 1). Based on the model’s predictions, we sort these segments by percentile rankings of predicted probabilities. We focus on the top 5% of segments with the highest predicted probabilities of relating to culture.

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<sup>16</sup> We use the following phrases for this exact matching process: “corporate culture,” “company culture,” “company’s culture,” “firm culture,” “firm’s culture,” “organizational culture,” “workplace culture,” “business culture,” and “culture in the company.”

<sup>17</sup> For the segments containing the word “cultural,” the definition is simply “Cultural: of or relating to culture, defined as ...”, followed by the corresponding definition for “culture.”

In step 3, we use GPT to screen the segments. Although the trained model achieves a high AUC (at 0.981), we observe a significant number of false positives. The segments predicted with high probabilities often pertain to other intangible aspects such as leadership or strategy, rather than corporate culture. To address this issue, we integrate the capabilities of GPT for an additional layer of filtering. Table IA2 Panel B shows the prompt. The prompt instructs GPT to assess whether each input segment is relevant to corporate culture, based on any of the following four definitions of corporate or organizational culture: principles and values guiding employees (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2015), shared beliefs, assumptions, values, or preferences driving group behaviors (Li and Van den Steen 2021), norms and values widely shared and strongly held in the organization (O'Reilly and Chatman 1996), or an informal institution characterized by behavioral patterns reinforced by events, people, and systems (Grennan and Li 2023).

For each input segment, GPT is asked to provide a brief explanation (not exceeding 50 words) justifying whether the segment discusses corporate or organizational culture topics as per the provided definitions, and a classification of the segment as either "Culture" or "No Culture." Only those segments classified as "Culture" are retained. This step adds 97,507 segments. Our final data set comprises 138,545 culture-related segments (41,038 segments from step 1 + 97,507 segments from steps 2 and 3). For reports containing multiple culture-related segments, these segments are combined into a single consolidated segment. This consolidation facilitates subsequent analysis by treating each report as a coherent unit of observation. The resulting data set consists of 86,112 segments. Each of them represents the aggregated culture-related content within a single report.

To optimize efficiency and minimize cost when leveraging GPT, we implement batch prompting (Cheng, Kasai, and Yu 2023) and parallel processing through multithreading. Batch prompting allows the model to generate responses for multiple samples in one batch during a single inference run, reducing the total number of API calls needed from  $N$  to  $N/b$ , where  $N$  represents the total number of samples and  $b$  signifies the number of samples per batch. We set  $b = 5$  following Cheng, Kasai, and Yu (2023), who demonstrate this provides an optimal balance between cost and model performance. The multithreading implementation uses a thread pool executor to process multiple batches concurrently across separate CPU threads. This parallel architecture substantially reduces total processing time compared to sequential execution. Each thread independently handles API calls for its assigned batch while maintaining thread safety through synchronously writing results to an SQLite database. We set the temperature parameter to 0 and random seed to 1 to ensure deterministic output.

Figure IA1 plots the intensity of culture-related segments in analyst reports over time and by report section over the period 2000-2020. The horizontal axis indicates report year, and the vertical axis indicates report section, binned into 20 equal sections from the start to the end of a report. The color gradient depicts the intensity of culture-related segments, computed as the number of these segments normalized by the number of reports in a year (we multiply this variable by a hundred).

We make two observations. First, there is a shift in the location of culture-related segments in reports. At the beginning of the sample period, these segments are generally scattered throughout a report. In more recent years, they appear more concentrated in the first half of a report. This shift suggests that, over time, analysts are more aware of the importance of culture, and hence they position their culture-related analyses in the front end of their reports. Second, there is a marked rise in the intensity of culture-related segments in reports in recent years following a discernable dip during and in the aftermath of the Great Recession (2008-2012); this dip could potentially be attributed to analysts' heightened focus on financial performance and cost-cutting in a period of economic uncertainty.

## 5. Cause-effect Relation Extraction (RE)

Our approach leverages the power of generative AI (Blanco, Castell, and Moldovan 2008; Radinsky, Davidovich, and Markovitch 2012; Heindorf et al. 2020) combined with two key techniques: chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting and retrieval augmented generation (RAG). We apply these techniques in a two-stage process.

In the first stage, we employ CoT prompting to provide a structured reasoning framework for the model. The CoT prompt (Table 1 Panel A) guides the generative AI model to break down the task of relation extraction into a series of discrete steps. For each input segment, the model first identifies and extracts any mentioned culture type. It then looks for causal factors that influenced a culture type (causes) as well as downstream impacts or outcomes that the culture type had on the organization (effects). Finally, the model composes the extracted culture type, causes, and effects into standardized cause-effect triples. Depending on the richness of the discussion, a single segment may yield multiple causal triples or none at all. In cases where the segment text alone lacks sufficient context for the model to confidently discern any culture type or causal relations, it outputs “I need more context” and the segment is passed to the second stage.

The second stage handles segments where the model requests additional context. We employ RAG to dynamically integrate relevant information from other parts of the report. For each segment needing more context, we perform semantic search using cosine similarity between pre-computed embeddings to identify related segments. The search retrieves up to five most similar segments, filtered by a probability threshold set at the 75th percentile of culture-relevance probabilities (as determined by the BERT-based culture probability model in A.4) across all segments. We also include segments immediately preceding and following the focal segment, as these often contain contextual information. The total context is constrained by a maximum token count of 128,000 tokens to prevent exceeding model context windows. When selecting context segments, we prioritize retaining segments with higher similarity scores while removing less similar ones until the token constraint is satisfied. Non-adjacent segments in the final context are separated by skip markers ([...]) to maintain logical flow. The model then receives both the focal segment and this filtered additional context as input. With this augmented input, the model re-attempts relation extraction using the same CoT prompting approach. If no cause (effect) relations can be confidently extracted even with additional context, the model produces an empty output for that segment.

## 6. Canonicalization of Culture Types, Causes, and Effects

A key challenge in extracting corporate culture-related insights from text is the linguistic diversity in how cultural concepts are discussed. Analysts may refer to the same culture type, cause, or effect using a wide variety of phrasings and terminologies. To enable meaningful aggregation and analysis of the extracted cause or effect relations, we implement a canonicalization process for normalizing the extracted culture types, causes, and effects to a standardized taxonomy.

For culture types, we employ a two-stage approach combining manual and AI-driven categorization.

In the first stage, we focus on the most frequently mentioned culture types, causes, and effects, specifically, the unique phrases that appear at least ten times across our corpus of analyst reports. We manually review and categorize each of those phrases into a taxonomy of six broad culture types, 18 causes, and 17 effects drawn from prior literature. This manual categorization involves each author independently reviewing and categorizing the phrases, with disagreements or ambiguities resolved through discussion and by referring back to the original report context in which the phrase was used. The prototypical examples are used in our prompt in Table 1 Panels A and B.

In the second stage, because we find that the miscellaneous/other category from stage one contains potentially relevant cultural phrases that warrant more precise classification. In other words, the model has false positives in classifying categories as miscellaneous/other. To further refine this category, we perform an additional round of generative AI categorization on only the phrases initially categorized as miscellaneous/other. We first conduct a manual inspection of the most frequent phrases initially classified as miscellaneous/other. After examining these phrases, we document representative examples and use them as prompts in Table IA2 Panels C-E to help the model perform another pass on the miscellaneous/other category.

The above two steps give us culture types, causes, and effects in a standardized taxonomy, but we still need to canonicalize the full cause-effect triples into a consistent format. This involves the following steps:

1. We map one of the entities in each extracted triple to one of our standardized culture types, leveraging the phrase-to-category mapping developed earlier. This entity becomes the normalized culture type for the triple.
2. We use generative AI to classify the specific causal relationship between the two entities as either forward causality ( $->$ , the first entity causes the second), backward causality ( $<-$ , the second entity causes the first), or bidirectional causality ( $<->$ , the entities mutually influence each other). For example, “provides opportunity for” is canonicalized as  $->$ , “threatened by” as  $<-$ , and “align with” as  $<->$ .
3. We then determine which of the two entities is the culture entity and which is the “other” (i.e., cause or effect) entity. To do so, we calculate the similarity between each entity and the raw extracted culture type phrase associated with the triple, using fuzzy string matching. Specifically, we use the `partial_token_set_ratio` metric from the `fuzzywuzzy` library, which computes the similarity between two strings based on their shared token sets while allowing for partial token matches. The entity with the higher similarity score is designated as the “culture” entity, while the other is designated as the “other” entity (representing a cause or effect). In rare cases where both similarity scores are lower than 80 (less than 80% of the tokens in the extracted cultural phrase match the tokens in either entity after accounting for partial matches), we perform an additional check for the presence of culture-related keywords (e.g., “culture,” “cultural”) to make the designation.
4. Finally, by examining the directionality of the classified causal relation, we then determine whether the “other” entity is a cause (if pointing to the culture entity) or an effect (if originating from the culture entity).

The end result is a fully standardized causal triple of the form (Culture\_Type, Relation\_Direction, Cause\_or\_Effect) for each extracted relation. Table 1 Panel B shows the prompt to canonicalize the causes (effects) of a culture type.

## **7. Relation Extraction and Canonicalization of Earnings Call Transcripts and Glassdoor Employee Reviews**

The identification of culture-related segments, relation extraction, and canonicalization of earnings call transcripts and Glassdoor employee reviews largely follow our process for analyst reports.

Our earnings call data over the period 2004-2020 is from Capital IQ Transcripts database. We take a number of steps to clean the data, including removing firms without Capital IQ company ID, keep earnings conference calls only (removing other types of calls), dropping duplicated calls, using the last copy of a call, and retaining calls that can merge with gvkey. Our final call sample comprises 243,501 calls by 12,006 firms (corresponding to 72,749 firm-year observations).

Our Glassdoor employee review data over the period 2008-2020 is from Revelio Lab. After matching employer to gvkey, our final employee review sample comprises 5,343,864 reviews by employees from 5,187 firms (corresponding to 41,969 firm-year observations).

Our core methodology remains consistent across these two different corpora, with four specific adaptations to account for their distinct features.

First, the text segmentation process differs. Earnings call components (separated by each speaker) and employee reviews serve as natural units of analysis, which eliminates the need of the C99 algorithm for text chunking. For earnings calls, each component is usually a paragraph of presentation or a

complete answer from an executive to an analyst's question during Q&As. Each employee review represents a self-contained segment that typically focuses on a specific culture type.

Second, the context augmentation requirement differs. We do not apply RAG to earnings call components or employee reviews. These text units are sufficiently self-contained, rendering additional context retrieval unnecessary. The culture type, causes, and effects are typically within the segment itself, when applicable.

Third, the prompt specification requires customization. We tailor the prompts to reflect each corpus' different context. The earnings call prompt refers to "executives' discussions during earnings calls about corporate culture." For Glassdoor data, the prompt specifies "employee reviews of companies from Glassdoor.com about corporate culture." These contextual markers help direct the model's interpretive framework.

## **B. Matching Analyst Name in Reports to Analyst ID (AMASKCD) in I/B/E/S**

We match the lead analyst's (i.e., the first author of a report) name to analyst ID (AMASKCD) in the I/B/E/S database as follows.

First, to unmask abbreviated broker names and analyst names from I/B/E/S, we manually search each broker's full name and its analysts from Capital IQ. Our matching process involves three steps: 1) we match abbreviated broker names in I/B/E/S (ESTIMID) to full broker names in Capital IQ by resemblance; 2) we ascertain the match in Step 1 by matching analyst names (ANALYST) in I/B/E/S with those in Capital IQ using the last name and first name initial; and 3) we supplement the above two steps by checking whether Capital IQ analysts' stock coverage is the same as that by matched I/B/E/S analysts. Of the 1,075 broker names in I/B/E/S, we are able to unmask full names for 928 brokers (an 86.3% matching rate).

We then obtain analyst information, including biography and prefix (Mr. versus Ms.), from their employment history in Capital IQ. In the end, we are able to unmask 13,164 out of the 14,909 analysts in the I/B/E/S Detail Recommendations file (an 88.3% matching rate).

Second, to match each analyst in the report sample to analyst ID (AMASKCD) in the I/B/E/S data set, we match each analyst's name in Investext to our unmasked broker names and analyst names in the I/B/E/S-Capital IQ merged sample as described above. Our matching proceeds as follows: 1) we match each broker in Investext to broker name and ID (EMASKCD) in the I/B/E/S-Capital IQ merged file; of the 1,006 unique brokers in Investext, we can link 443 brokers with EMASKCD – analysts affiliated with these 443 brokers produce 91% of the reports in our report sample; and 2) for cases in which Investext has lead analyst's full first name and full last name, we match analyst name in Investext to analyst name and ID (AMASKCD) in the I/B/E/S-Capital IQ merged file; we further verify this match if there is also a match between broker name and EMASKCD established above. In the end, we are able to uncover AMASKCD for 7,921 analysts, representing 78% of the analysts affiliated with the 443 brokers in our analyst report sample.

Our final sample comprises 1,744,540 reports covering 38,530 firm-year observations for 2,988 unique firms over the period 2000-2020.

## **C. Matching Analyst Reports to I/B/E/S Forecast Data**

When examining whether and how analysts' perspectives on culture impact price formation at the report level, we need to control for each report's quantitative and qualitative output (i.e., earnings forecast, stock recommendation, and target price). As a result, we need to match analyst reports from

Investext in our sample with I/B/E/S forecast data following prior work (e.g., Huang, Zang, and Zheng 2014).

We employ a similar approach to link each report with its earnings forecast, stock recommendation, and target price in I/B/E/S. Here is an illustration of the process using earnings forecasts as an example.

Each report in our sample (from Section B) has a report date (DATE), a firm ID from I/B/E/S (CUSIP), an analyst ID from I/B/E/S (AMASKCD), and a broker ID from I/B/E/S (EMASKCD). Each earnings forecast in the I/B/E/S Detail file has an announcement date (ANNDATS), a review date (REVDATS), a firm ID (CUSIP), an analyst ID (AMASKCD), and a broker ID (EMASKCD). The announcement date is the day when an analyst revises her estimate and provides a forecast in a report. The review date is the day when an analyst confirms to I/B/E/S that her outstanding forecast is current. In I/B/E/S, a forecast is considered valid during the period from its announcement date until its review date. Within the period, analysts may issue multiple reports reiterating a forecast, but these reiterations have no separate entries in I/B/E/S.

We use a matching window, which is two days before a report's announcement date to two days after its review date, to match a report from Investext in our sample to an earnings forecast from I/B/E/S if the report date (from Investext) is within the “matching window,” and there is a match of CUSIP-AMASKCD-EMASKCD between a report in our sample and an I/B/E/S earnings forecast.

Of the 1,744,540 reports in our sample (from Section B), we are able to match stock recommendations from I/B/E/S for 1,413,260 reports (an 81.0% matching rate), representing 36,100 firm-year observations associated with 2,898 unique firms; we are able to match target prices for 1,402,233 reports (an 80.4% matching rate), representing 35,673 firm-year observations and 2,887 unique firms. The samples used in Table 9 are smaller due to data availability for control variables.

Finally, we are able to match earnings estimates, stock recommendations, and target prices from I/B/E/S for 1,089,760 reports (a 62.5% matching rate), representing 34,314 firm-year observations associated with 2,858 firms. After limiting the sample with corporate culture discussion, the sample consists of 40,935 reports, representing 13,666 firm-year observations associated with 2,330 firms. The sample used in Table 8 is smaller due to data availability for control variables.


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**Figure IA1**

**Intensity of analysts' culture-related discussions by year and report section**

This heatmap depicts the intensity of analysts' culture-related discussions across years and report sections. Our sample comprises 2.4 million analyst reports over the period 2000–2020. The horizontal axis indicates report year, and the vertical axis indicates report section, binned into 20 equal sections from the start to the end of a report. The color gradient, ranging from light to dark, signifies the intensity of analysts' culture-related discussions. Intensity is computed as  $100 \times$  the number of culture-related segments in a section divided by the number of reports in a year.

**Table IA1**  
**Examples of the boilerplate segments**

Decile	Probability	Example
10	0.998	<p>The investments or services contained or referred to in this report may not be suitable for you and it is recommended that you consult an independent investment advisor if you are in doubt about such investments or investment services.</p> <p>Nothing in this report constitutes investment, legal, accounting or tax advice or a representation that any investment or strategy is suitable or appropriate to your individual circumstances or otherwise constitutes a personal recommendation to you. CS does not offer advice on the tax consequences of investment and you are advised to contact an independent tax adviser.</p>
9	0.979	EEA -The securities and related financial instruments described herein may not be eligible for sale in all jurisdictions or to certain categories of investors.
8	0.925	<p>Distribution of ratings: See the distribution of ratings disclosure above.</p> <p>Price Chart: See the price chart, with changes of ratings and price targets in prior periods, above, or, if in electronic format or if with respect to multiple companies which are the subject of this report, on the DBSI website at <a href="http://gm.db.com">http://gm.db.com</a>.</p>
7	0.871	<p>Suspended -the company rating, target price and earnings estimates have been temporarily suspended.</p> <p>For disclosure purposes, Evercore Group's prior "Overweight," "Equal-Weight" and "Underweight" ratings were viewed as "Buy," "Hold" and "Sell," respectively.</p> <p>Evercore ISI utilizes an alternate rating system for companies covered by analysts who use a model portfolio-based approach to determine a company's investment recommendation.</p>
6	0.858	As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of the report and investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision.
5	0.264	<p>He also noted the Fed now has much more robust tools to guard against systemic risk vs. overseeing individual institutions.</p> <p>There were no questions about the history of the supervision process of large bank holding companies within the Atlanta Fed (district six) or more generally the troubled Georgia and Florida real estate markets.</p>
4	0.054	<p>These contracts usually have 1-5 year terms.</p> <p>Since residential customers generally fall under local government jurisdictions, the contracts are negotiated with the municipality -which in turn, will bill the residential customer through taxes.</p> <p>For larger commercial and industrial customers, the company will negotiate directly with the end-user.</p>
3	0.028	<p>Integration of recent acquisitions.</p> <p>Our downside risk for the shares is \$10, which represents just over 10x our 2012 EPS estimate of \$0.95 and is typically the bottom end of the company's historical multiple range.</p>
2	0.003	<p>We include these gains in our calculation of ongoing earnings because they are not entirely one-time though they are infrequent items.</p> <p>We have raised our 2005 EPS estimate to \$1.50 from \$1.40 to include an expected \$0.11 fourth quarter investment gain on the sale of an interest in a coal-fired power plant in Georgia.</p>
1	0.000	<p>"Harman is still in a transitional phase with its highly anticipated scalable infotainment backlog not launching until fiscal 2013/2014.</p> <p>And while we acknowledge the company has made significant progress on the cost side, Harman will have to consistently execute on those cost cutting initiatives for the next several quarters to help prop-up its low-price and low-margin customized business."</p>

The table provides examples of the boilerplate segments in analyst reports, sorted by the predicted probability of a segment being boilerplate using a fine-tuned BERT model (in descending order). We retain segments with the predicted probability at 0.22 (the sample median) or lower.

**Table IA2****Prompts to filter culture-related segments in analyst reports and refine classification of culture types/causes/effects****Panel A: Prompt to perform word sense disambiguation**

Perform word sense disambiguation on the word 'culture(s)' or 'cultural' in the input segments. These segments are from sell-side equity analyst research reports on companies. Classify each input segment into one of the three categories: 'organizational,' 'societal,' or 'biological.' Definitions for these categories are as follows:

- \* organizational culture: 'The values, typical practices, and goals of a business or other organization, especially a large corporation. e.g., Their corporate "culture" frowns on avoiding risk. We recognize a cost-cutting "culture". '
- \* societal culture: 'The behaviors and beliefs characteristic of a particular group of people, as a social, ethnic, professional, or age group (usually used in combination). e.g., the youth "culture"; the drug "culture".'
- \* biological culture: 'Biology. the cultivation of microorganisms, as bacteria, or of tissues, for scientific study, medicinal use, etc. or the product or growth resulting from such cultivation. e.g., cell "culture".'

For each input segment, provide:

1. The input ID (input\_id).
2. The classification of the word 'culture(s)' or 'cultural' in input text as 'organizational,' 'societal,' or 'biological.'

Format your response in JSON. Make sure you process all of the inputs. Response format:

```
{"all_results": [
  [
    {
      "input_id": "XXXX",
      "classification": "organizational/societal/biological",
    },
    {
      "input_id": "YYYY",
      "classification": "organizational/societal/biological",
    },
    ... (other inputs)
  ]
}]
```

**Panel B: Prompt to determine if a segment is really about corporate culture**

Assess whether each of the following input segments is relevant to corporate or organizational culture. The segments are from sell-side equity analyst research reports on companies. An input segment is relevant to corporate or organizational culture if it discusses topics consistent with any of the following definitions for corporate or organizational culture:

- \* "principles and values that should inform the behavior of all the firms' employees."
- \* "a group's shared beliefs, assumptions, values, or preferences that then drive that group's behaviors."
- \* "a set of norms and values that are widely shared and strongly held throughout the organization."
- \* "an informal institution typified by patterns of behavior and reinforced by events, people, and systems."

For each input segment, provide:

1. The input ID (input\_id).
2. Brief reasons (in 50 words or less) that explain if the segment contains discussions about corporate or organizational culture topics using ANY of the definitions provided above.
3. Classification of the segment as 'Culture' if it is relevant to corporate or organizational culture, or as 'No Culture' if it does not.

Format your response in JSON. Make sure you process all of the inputs. Response format:

```
{"all_results": [
  [
    {
      "input_id": "XXXX",
      "explanation": "This segment is relevant to corporate/organizational culture because...",
      "classification": "Culture",
    },
    {
    }
  ]
}]
```

```

        "input_id": "YYYY",
        "explanation": "This segment is not relevant to corporate/organizational culture because
it mainly discusses...",
        "classification": "No Culture",
    },
    ... (other segments)
]
}

```

#### Panel C: Prompt to further classify “miscellaneous” culture types

Task: Categorize the phrases on corporate culture into one of the following six types:

- \* Collaboration and People-Focused: Focusing on (or deficient in) collaboration, cooperation, teamwork, supportive, low levels of conflict, community, communication within an organization, employee well-being, employee equity sharing and compensation, diversity, inclusion, empowerment, or talent.
- \* Customer-Oriented: Focusing on (or deficient in) sales, customer, customer service, listening to the customer, customer retention, customer experience, customer satisfaction, user experience, client service, being brand-driven, quality of product, quality of service, quality of solution, or taking pride in service.
- \* Innovation and Adaptability: Focusing on (or deficient in) innovation, creativity, technology, entrepreneurship, adaptability, transformations, flexibility, agility, willingness to experiment, beyond tradition, disruption, fast-moving, quick to take advantage of opportunities, resilience to change, or taking initiative.
- \* Integrity and Risk Management: Focusing on (or deficient in) integrity, high ethical standards, being honest, being transparent, accountability, do the right thing, fair practices, being trustworthy, risk management, risk control, compliance, discipline, or financial prudence.
- \* Performance-Oriented: Focusing on (or deficient in) high expectations for performance, sales growth, achievement, competitiveness, results, hard work, efficiency, productivity, consistency in executing tasks, setting clear goals, following best practices, striving for operational excellence, or exceeding benchmarks.
- \* Miscellaneous: Non-specific corporate culture, or corporate culture that does not easily fit into the above types. For example, “strong culture”, “weak culture”, “positive culture”, “negative culture”, or “cultural change” (without details on the company’s culture).

JSON Output Structure:

```
{
  "all_results": [
    {
      "input_phrase_id": 1,
      "input_phrase": "",
      "canonical_entity": "One of the predefined standardized entity names or 'Miscellaneous'"
    },
    ...
  ]
}
```

#### Panel D: Prompt to further classify “other” causes

As an expert specializing in corporate culture and causal reasoning, conduct entity canonicalization on selected phrases taken from analyst reports. These phrases are considered to be \*causes of corporate culture\*. Your objective is to map each phrase to the most appropriate standardized entity name from the predefined list below.

Instructions:

- Review the provided examples for each standardized entity to grasp their scope and nuances.
- Carefully analyze each phrase and assign it to the most fitting standardized entity based on its underlying meaning.
- Assign the phrase to "Other" only if it does not align with any of the predefined entities.

Before assigning a phrase to "Other", ensure that it does not reasonably fit any existing categories.

The available standardized entity names and examples are:

----

\* COVID-19:

\* Disruptive technology:

\* Economic downturn:

\* Internal conflicts:

```

* Mergers and acquisitions:
Examples: "integration challenges", "integration risks", "cultural integration challenges"
* Management change:
Examples: "appointment of chief diversity officer"
* Market expansion:
Examples: "increased competition", "improved market position"
* Regulatory issues:
Examples: "food safety incidents", "SEC investigation"
* Shareholder activism:

* Strategic transformation:
Examples: "new organizational structure", "organizational change", "transition to a more solutions-based focus", "new product launches", "organizational structure changes"
* Customer relations:
Examples: "strong brand reputation", "strong Midwestern franchise", "strong brand recognition", "strong brand"
* Management team:
Examples: "management initiatives", "management decisions", "key individuals", "management's focus on culture"
* Compensation structure:
Examples: "correct makeup of human capital", "high cost of living in California"
* Employee hiring and retention:

* Business relationship:
Examples: "long-standing personal relationships with management", "local decision makers"
* Business strategy:
Examples: "Danaher Business System (DBS)", "decentralized structure", "investment in technology", "strong balance sheet", "management's conservative approach", "investment in R&D", "decentralized organizational structure", "decentralized management structure", "commitment to R&D", "One Ford strategy", "My Macy's initiative", "no-haggle pricing model", "management's focus on efficiency", "focus on R&D", "decentralized operating structure", "cost-cutting measures", "strong defensible competitive position", "flat organizational structure", "focus on operational excellence", "cost savings initiatives", "custom solutions", "increased R&D spending", "heavy reliance on internal development", "focus on execution", "guiding principles", "focus on cost control", "increased accountability", "Honeywell Operating System (HOS)", "Fortive Business System", "cost reductions", "cost reduction initiatives", "strong financial commitment to drug development", "lean initiatives", "internal initiatives", "long history as an asset manager", "implementation of MAGIC Selling program", "focus on cost management", "flattened organizational structure", "first-mover advantage", "financial commitment to drug development", "focus on efficiency", "ethos prohibiting preservatives", "decentralization", "establishing guiding principles", "decentralized operating model", "conservative credit culture"
* Workplace safety:

----


JSON Output Structure: {
  "all_results": [
    {
      "input_phrase_id": 1,
      "input_phrase": "",
      "canonical_entity": "One of the predefined standardized entity names or 'Other'"
    },
    {
      "input_phrase_id": 2,
      "input_phrase": "",
      "canonical_entity": "One of the predefined standardized entity names or 'Other'"
    }
    ...
  ]
}

```

### Panel E: Prompt to further classify “other” effects

As an expert specializing in corporate culture and causal reasoning, conduct entity canonicalization on selected phrases taken from analyst reports. These phrases are considered to be \*consequences of corporate culture\*. Your objective is to map each phrase to the most appropriate standardized entity name from the predefined list below.

#### Instructions:

- Review the provided examples for each standardized entity to grasp their scope and nuances.
- Carefully analyze each phrase and assign it to the most fitting standardized entity based on its underlying meaning.
- Assign the phrase to "Other" only if it does not align with any of the predefined entities.

Before assigning a phrase to "Other", ensure that it does not reasonably fit any existing categories.

The available standardized entity names and examples are:

----

#### \* Market share and growth:

Examples: "competitive advantage", "sustainable competitive advantage", "improved competitive positioning", "narrow economic moat", "wider economic moats", "improved competitive position", "differentiation from competitors", "increased competitiveness", "competitive differentiation", "enhanced competitive positioning", "differentiation from peers", "differentiation from competition", "enhanced competitive position", "potential for multiple expansion", "success attributed to local decision makers", "competitive advantages", "strong financial position", "competitive positioning", "key competitive advantage", "pricing power", "better job of gathering and retaining assets", "better asset retention", "sustained competitive advantages", "better-run restaurants", "attractive investment opportunity", "concerns about straying from core competencies", "competitive edge"

#### \* Profitability:

Examples: "improved operational efficiency", "increased productivity", "improved productivity", "improved execution", "improved performance", "improved efficiency", "improved operations", "consistent investment performance", "better execution", "improved results", "enhanced operational efficiency", "strong performance", "operational efficiency", "improved balance sheet", "operational excellence", "operational improvements", "enhanced productivity", "streamlined operations", "stable moat trend", "positive free cash flow", "operational improvement", "leaner organization", "improved financial profile", "improved store operations", "strong cash flow generation", "superior results", "productivity gains", "operational challenges", "faster decision-making", "increased efficiencies", "stronger cash flows", "improved store productivity", "healthier balance sheet", "improved decision-making", "improved operational execution", "solid performance", "improved inventory management", "improved sales force productivity", "increased operational efficiency", "improved working capital", "improved overall performance", "improved fund performance", "high degree of consistency of operations", "financial results", "better performance", "better decision-making", "improved restaurant operations", "efficiency gains", "sharing of best practices", "significant free cash flow", "streamlined operations", "improve design and quality", "maximized yields for farmers", "consistent execution", "enhanced operational performance", "increased agent productivity", "disciplined capital allocation", "above-average execution", "enhanced productivity"

#### \* Customer satisfaction:

Examples: "improved product quality", "improved brand perception", "increased brand awareness", "improved quality of care", "sales disruptions", "improved company image", "improved brand equity", "increased brand equity", "improved market perception", "improved patient outcomes", "increased brand recognition", "improved visibility", "improved user experience", "improved reputation", "successful brand management", "improved health outcomes", "diminished reputation", "elevated brand"

#### \* Employee satisfaction:

Examples: "improved collaboration", "cultural transformation", "enhanced collaboration", "effective teamwork", "improved communication", "employees", "improved internal collaboration"

#### \* Mergers and acquisitions:

Examples: "successful cultural integration"

#### \* Internal conflicts:

Examples: "organizational changes", "decentralized management structure", "decentralized organizational structure", "improved organizational structure", "cultural changes", "difficulty in changing culture", "corporate culture shock", "decentralization"

#### \* Innovation

#### \* Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion

#### \* Management change and retention

#### \* Risk management:

Examples: "increased accountability", "improved accountability", "improved credit quality", "improved transparency", "pristine credit quality", "improved internal controls", "improved asset quality", "greater accountability", "solid credit quality", "strong asset quality", "stronger than peer asset quality numbers", "debt reduction", "minimized franchise risk", "improved credit profile", "strong credit quality", "greater transparency", "accountability", "better accountability", "stable credit quality", "strong credit culture"

\* Misconducts

\* Resilience:

Examples: "successful turnaround", "earnings volatility", "business model uncertainty", "consistent results", "successful transition", "financial flexibility", "successful transition to a dynamic competitor", "turnaround success", "potential turnaround", "increased flexibility", "significant negative impact on business", "successful cultural integration", "potential for improved performance", "financial stability", "successful execution of strategy"

\* Business relationship:

Examples: "top ranking in agent surveys", "increased collaboration", "local decision makers"

\* ESG practices

\* Shareholder value:

Examples: "long-term success", "improved corporate governance", "effective capital allocation", "share price volatility", "stock price volatility", "continued success", "consistent results", "improved capital allocation", "major contributor to company's success", "stock underperformance", "stock price decline", "disciplined capital allocation"

\* Investor relations

----

JSON Output Structure:

```
{
  "all_results": [
    {
      "input_phrase_id": 1,
      "input_phrase": "",
      "canonical_entity": "One of the standardized entity names."
    },
    {
      "input_phrase_id": 2,
      "input_phrase": "",
      "canonical_entity": "One of the standardized entity names."
    }
    ...
  ]
}
```

This table presents detailed instructions given to our generative AI model to filter corporate culture-related segments in analyst reports and to refine classification of miscellaneous/other culture types/causes/effects. Panel A shows the prompt for word sense disambiguation relating to the words “culture(s)” and “cultural.” Panel B shows the prompt to determine whether a segment with a high predicted probability of relating to culture is really about corporate culture. Panel C shows the prompt to further classify miscellaneous culture types. Panel D shows the prompt to further classify other causes. Panel C shows the prompt to further classify other effects.

**Table IA3**  
**Mapping our culture types to culture types identified in prior work**

	Our paper (1)	Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015) (2)	Grennan (2019) (3)	Li et al. (2021) (4)	Graham et al. (2022a, 2022b) (5)
Data source(s)	Analyst reports Earnings calls Glassdoor reviews	Corporate website	Employee reviews	Earnings calls	Executive surveys and interviews
Culture type	Collaboration and people-focused Customer-oriented Innovation and adaptability Integrity and risk management Performance-oriented	Respect Teamwork Quality Innovation Communication Community Integrity Safety Hard work	Collaboration Customer-orientation Adaptability Integrity Transparency Detail-orientation Results-orientation	Respect Teamwork Quality Innovation Integrity Community Integrity Detail-orientation Results-orientation	Collaboration Customer-orientation Adaptability Community Integrity Detail-orientation Results-orientation

This table maps culture types in our paper to culture types examined by prior work. Given that some culture types in prior work are quite broad, for example, the cultural value of “communication” in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015) has one seed word “openness,” and the cultural value of “community” in Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015) has three seed words “environment, caring, and citizenship,” as a result, the mapping demonstrates our best effort and should not be perceived as exactly one-to-one mapping. The first column lists the five culture types that analysts/executives/employees refer to when discussing culture extracted by generative AI in our paper.

**Table IA4**  
**Representative examples of the extracted culture types, their causes, and their effects**

Panel A: Different culture types

Culture type	Example
Collaboration and people-focused	collaborative culture, integration-oriented culture, team-oriented culture, cohesive corporate culture, partnership-oriented culture, cooperative culture, team-based culture, silos culture, alignment-oriented culture, collegial culture, employee-centric culture, inclusive culture, diverse corporate culture, family-oriented culture, people-centric culture, talent-focused culture, people-focused culture, empowering culture, internal-promotion culture, supportive culture
Customer-oriented	customer-centric culture, sales-driven culture, sales-oriented culture, service-oriented culture, customer-focused culture, customer-centric, client-focused culture, client-centric culture, client-oriented culture, consumer-centric culture, customer-obsessed culture, customer support-focused culture, customer-friendly culture, user experience centric culture, culture of customer satisfaction, brand-centric culture, brand-driven culture
Innovation and adaptability	innovative culture, entrepreneurial culture, growth-oriented culture, innovative corporate culture, data-driven culture, technology-driven culture, innovation-driven culture, knowledge-driven culture, creative and innovative culture, entrepreneurial and decentralized culture, adaptive culture, adaptive corporate culture, change-oriented culture, resilient culture, proactive culture, continuous improvement culture, evolving culture, transformative culture, transformational culture, agile culture
Integrity and risk management	accountable culture, community-oriented culture, ethical corporate culture, socially responsible culture, accountability culture, accountability-driven culture, values-driven culture, integrity-based culture, transparent culture, integrity-driven culture, disciplined culture, conservative culture, risk-averse culture, cautious culture, risk-aware culture, safety-oriented culture, compliance-oriented culture, financially disciplined culture, prudent culture, risk management culture
Performance-oriented	performance-driven culture, results-oriented culture, competitive culture, aggressive culture, profit-driven culture, goal-oriented culture, high-performance culture, shareholder-focused culture, winning culture, success-driven culture, decentralized culture, cost-conscious culture, efficiency-driven culture, efficiency-oriented culture, quality-focused culture, cost-cutting culture, detail-oriented culture, centralized culture, process-oriented culture, operational culture
Miscellaneous	challenging corporate culture, acquisitive culture, ambitious culture, stable corporate culture, dedicated corporate culture, experienced corporate culture, focused culture, unique culture, traditional corporate culture, long-term focused culture

Panel B: Different causes of culture

Category	Cause	Example
Event	COVID-19	covid-19 pandemic, disruption from covid-19, response to covid-19 pandemic, uncertainty related to the covid-19 pandemic, covid disruptions
Event	Disruptive technology	disruptive products, next-generation technology, focus on disruptive innovation, phase of disruptive technology, breakthrough innovations through AI
Event	Economic downturn	financial crisis, economic cycle, economic downturn, economic environment deterioration, weak macro environment and jobs market
Event	Internal conflicts	Bureaucracy, internal politics, disconnect between IT department and senior management, history of frequent strike activity, internal power struggles
Event	Management change	leadership change, new management team, management turnover, new CEO, separation of chairman and CEO roles
Event	Market expansion	international expansion, expansion into new markets, global presence,

		rapid expansion, seeking new areas of growth
Event	Mergers and acquisitions	acquisitions, strategic acquisitions, mergers and acquisitions, M&A activities, integration of acquired businesses
Event	Regulatory issues	regulatory actions, challenging regulatory environments, unknowns within consumer regulatory agency, regulatory changes, SEC investigation
Event	Shareholder activism	shareholder pressure, significant insider ownership, interaction with activist investors, agreement with activist investor for board changes, proxy fight with activist investor
Event	Strategic transformation	organizational restructuring, strategic initiatives, reorganization, transition to solutions-based focus, strategic changes, business transformation
People	Customer relations	focus on customer service, best-of-breed customer service, deep client relationships, decades of high-quality service, direct relationships with end-users
People	Management team	experienced management team, strong management team, CEO's leadership, visionary leadership, long-tenured management team
System	Business relationship	local management with deep roots in each community, valuable commercial client relationships, establishment of unique relationship with independent agents, ability to attract and foster close and long-lasting business relationships, strategic partnerships
System	Business strategy	training salesforce in value-over-volume strategy, focus on cost management, differentiated merchandising strategy, management's aggressive expansion initiative
System	Compensation structure	compensation structure, competitive compensation programs, compensation structure emphasizing incentive pay, incentive compensation structure, employee stock ownership
System	Employee hiring and retention	promotion from within, extensive training programs, long tenure of employees, workforce reduction, resisting layoffs during recession
System	Workplace safety	desire to minimize personal risk for employees, industry's effort to improve safety practices, independent safety oversight committee, efforts to improve safety practices, fair hearing and remedy process for workers' grievances
	Miscellaneous	structural attributes, resources, competitive environment, deep and broad industry expertise, accounting practices

Panel C: Different effects of culture

Effect	Example
Business relationship	strong customer relationships, cross-selling opportunities, critical industry relationships, retaining valuable commercial client relationships, stronger franchisee alignment
Customer satisfaction	improved customer service, improved customer experience, customer satisfaction, customer loyalty, improved customer satisfaction
Diversity, equity, and inclusion	improved diversity of leadership team, development of a diverse talent base, lack of diversity in board composition, promotion of more women, toxic culture of sexual harassment
Employee satisfaction	employee turnover, employee retention, low employee turnover, employee satisfaction, employee ownership
ESG practices	corporate governance weaknesses, environmental sustainability efforts, esg practices, enhanced governance practices, development of environmentally and ethically responsible products
Innovation	accelerated development of desirable new products, product innovation, new product development, technological leadership, focus on innovation
Internal conflicts	potential for business conflicts, wrestling with production planning, resistance to change, potential muddled strategy and infighting, management distraction

Investor relations	attractiveness to investors, rebuilding investor confidence, alignment of management and shareholder interests, shareholder friendliness, improved communication with investors
Management change and retention	loss of key personnel, management resource strain, smooth leadership transition, strong management team, management turnover
Market share and growth	revenue growth, market share gains, increased market share, expansion into new markets, establishing a strong presence in key markets around the world
Mergers and acquisitions	successful integration of acquisitions, successful acquisitions, challenges in integration, lower-than-expected synergies, M&A strategy
Misconduct	management protecting their own interests over investors, unusual accounting moves, massive legal liabilities, multiple scandals, legal troubles
Miscellaneous	Competitive advantage, long-term success, improved operations, continued success, positive geographic mix
Profitability	margin expansion, improved profitability, cost savings, increased profitability, more stable levels of profitability
Resilience	business resilience, resilience in the next downturn, resilience during recession, successful weathering of recent market volatility and macroeconomic uncertainty, persistent corporate momentum
Risk management	focus on risk management, focus and importance placed on risk management, handling credit risk well, improved credit quality, minimized franchise risk
Shareholder value	consistently above-average returns, strong balance sheet, returns exceeding cost of capital for longer periods, enhanced shareholder value, alignment of interests with shareholders

The table provides some representative examples of the extracted culture types, and their causes and effects. The causes are grouped into three categories: events, people, and systems suggested by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2015), Graham et al. (2022a, 2022b), and Grennan and Li (2023).

**Table IA5**  
**Examples of Retrieval Augmented Generation**

**Example 1.**

Obviously the company has tremendous visibility into 1Q04 since the quarter is 2/3 complete. We expect guidance to point to sequential revenue and earnings growth, and FY04 revenue growth of about 14 - 15%.

- We reiterate our view, that Symbol is emerging from 2003 leaner, with a now stable channel, and a fuller pipeline.

We believe revenue growth will come from a broadbased cyclical recovery, and that earnings will surge due to operational efficiencies that follow from 2003 restructuring activities, and the elimination of expenses related to the SEC investigation and internal audits.

[...]

We believe Symbol remains a high risk stock in view of the on-going SEC investigation and potential shareholder lawsuit awards against the company following revelations regarding accounting malpractices at the company in the period 1999 -2002.

A number of possible events could prompt us to view the stock more negatively and cause our \$22 price target not to be achieved within the 12 month time frame.

There is the risk that the Smart Media ruling (\$218 million award) could weaken the balance sheet, although we think that this possibility is not very likely.

Although Symbol is technically not in compliance with NYSE listing rules due to the delay in publishing audited results, we believe delisting risk is minimal given the ongoing and proactive dialogue between the company and the NYSE.

Although the results and restatements presented were summary, unaudited figures, we believe they went a long way towards reassuring investors and mitigating delisting risk.

In addition, the company has changed its supplier strategy, implemented a new channel strategy, centralized and relocated functions, installed new systems, processes and controls.

While the strategy appears to be paying off, it is possible that the company is doing too much too quickly and that execution problems may arise, or that the improvements will prove fleeting in the absence of a more substantial change of culture.

Symbol faces credible and emerging competition in each of its segments, including Cisco (wireless LANs), Proxim (Wireless LANs), Motorola (Wireless WANs), Unova (data capture solutions, ruggedized handhelds), Handheld Products (ruggedized computing), Metrologic (data capture solutions) and others.

Symbol's leadership in laser scanning is threatened marginally by the introduction of low-cost imaging solutions using CCD or CMOS sensors.

Extracted relation(s):

- **Ongoing SEC investigation (Regulatory issues) → Risk-aware culture (Integrity and risk management).**
- **Risk-aware culture (Integrity and risk management) → Potential shareholder lawsuit awards (Misconducts).**

Explanation: The original segment only mentions “improvements will prove fleeting in the absence of a more substantial change of culture.” It provides no basis for determining culture type or relationships. The new context revealing “accounting malpractices” and an “ongoing SEC investigation” allows the model to properly classify this as integrity and risk management culture and extract two key relationships: the SEC investigation influencing risk-aware culture, and this culture leading to potential shareholder lawsuits.

*This report was written by Paul Coster from JPMorgan for Symbol Technologies, Inc. released on 11/5/2003.*

**Example 2.**

Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg and BCA Chief Engineer John Hamilton provided testimony yesterday to the U.S. Senate's Commerce, Science & Transportation Committee and today to the House Committee on Transportation & Infrastructure.

Congress is investigating the two MAX crashes, and the MAX's certification process in an effort to make any needed changes to regulations to improve aircraft certification and enhance aviation safety.

We think investors have approached these hearings with an eye toward their short term impact, if any, on the return to service (RTS) of the MAX, which yielded +2% reaction yesterday and 1% reversal today.

Heated, but no major surprises: Committee members were prepared with pointed but reasonable questions for BA, and some displayed clear anger with what they viewed as obfuscation of the culture behind decisions that undermined MCAS and the MAX.

That said, we found the exchange to be largely as expected: hardline questioning from members with a sympathetic but tactical responses from Boeing.

One notable exhibit, a 2015 employee email questioning the single AOA sensor architecture was explained away as not triggering the required level of criticality for redundancy.

Ultimately, CEO Muilenburg defended Boeing's efforts in developing and certifying the MAX, but acknowledged Boeing made some mistakes.

When asked to cite the top three, he called out (1) the implementation of the AOA disagree alert, (2) MCAS architecture, and (3) communication and documentation shortfalls.

He emphasized BA's commitment to aviation safety and to ensuring such accidents never occur again. That said, there was no clear admission of willful concealment of MCAS or an attempt to avoid incremental training.

Some members questioned Mr. Muilenburg's accountability given his pay-levels after the first accident.

Extracted relation(s):

- **Investigations into crashes (Regulatory issues) → Accountability-driven safety culture (Integrity and risk management).**
- **Accountability-driven safety culture (Integrity and risk management) → Focus on improving safety regulations (Risk management).**

Explanation: The original segment mentions “obfuscation of the culture behind decisions that undermined MCAS and the MAX,” but provides insufficient context to determine specific cultural relationships. The retrieved context revealing Congressional investigations into “two MAX crashes” and “the MAX’s certification process” enables identification of cause-effect patterns: investigations driving an accountability-focused safety culture, and this culture fostering improved safety regulations. Specifically, the wider context detailing “Congress is investigating...to make needed changes to regulations to improve aircraft certification and enhance aviation safety” establishes the link between accountability culture and safety improvements.

*This report was written by Robert Spingarn from Credit Suisse for Boeing Company released on 10/30/2019.*

**Example 3.**

TAG Take: The overall tone of the event was positive, with Whole Foods emphasizing its unique position in the market.

The company acknowledged the tough FY14 in which an increasing number of competitors encroached on its space.

And, Whole Foods presented its case for still being a highly differentiated and evolving business, with initiatives underway to maintain or grow its market share and better engage customers.

Whole Foods emphasized its unique in-store experience, beyond simply being a grocer, and its increased use of technology and social media.

[...]

We continue to view Whole Foods as being in a transition period to mid-growth from high-growth and to somewhat defensive minded as competitors encroach on its natural/organic niche.

We maintain our Market Perform rating and 12-month price target of \$52, based on applying an EV/EBITDA multiple of 12.5x to our CY15 EBITDA estimate of \$1.48B.

[...]

Whole Foods follows an opportunistic real estate strategy, as it looks for the best sites it can find as opposed to following a set strategy by market.

In addition, all capital expenditure projects require an EVA analysis and must clear a five-year hurdle rate based on conservative forecasts for sales, capital, and rent.

Whole Foods has seen its rent increase 10% over the last five years, as the commercial real estate price index has risen 52%.

At the same time, the company has reduced the cost to build by 10% on a per square foot basis.

[...]

For example, seven locations were opened in Boston during FY13, providing weak comps the following year, but Boston is now delivering same-store sales above the company average.

With regard to competition, Whole Foods noted some stores might see a 10% headwind when a competitor opens, but after the first year Whole Foods starts to comp positively again.

Refreshing Older Stores and Lowering Cost Structure: Whole Foods refreshed 40 stores during 1QF15, and is on track to reach 200 by the end of 2015.

Décor refreshes are the least expensive and enhance the logos, colors, and lighting of the store, while the next level of refresh consists of bringing in new fixtures and cases, and lastly, some stores receive a full remodel. Beyond store refreshes, the company is working to lower the in-store cost structure.

[...]

Price Investments: Whole Foods continues to be about quality, service, selection, and store experience, but the company realizes it needs to offer relevant pricing.

With that in mind, Whole Foods has made some successful produce investments, but is continuing to search for the best pricing strategy.

Currently, lower produce pricing experiments are being conducted in six or seven markets, and some are expected to roll out even further in 2H15.

However, given the tests started in October and including the high-volume holiday season, it is too early to extrapolate the results.

Competitive produce pricing should expand the overall value perception, given that produce tends to be the first department customers shop when entering the store and can set the tone for the shopping experience.

So far, the company is pleased with the unit lift it has seen in the markets with produce pricing investments, and Whole Foods intends to fund the price investments through cost efficiency.

In addition, the company noted that promotions are equally as promising as lower everyday pricing.

[...]

Raising Food Standards: Although Whole Foods is widely known as a premier natural and organic grocer, the company is intent on continuing to set the pace for raising food standards and transparency.

In recent years, the company has implemented five-step animal welfare ratings for its meat sales, non-GMO and organic labeling, and sustainability ratings.

The pursuit of higher food standards has required Whole Foods to create unique partnerships with special growers around the world, such as bananas from Costa Rica, non-antibiotic farm-raised salmon in Norway, and pasture-raised chicken.

Evolving Store Experience: The company wants to give consumers a reason to come in the store beyond just food shopping by creating a unique experience at each store.

For example, Whole Foods now brews its own beers in two of its stores and roasts coffee in two markets.

The company also has one location with a spa and another with a restaurant that accepts reservations and offers table service.

Some stores offer a cooking studio to teach customers how to prepare healthier meals and other locations offer different community events.

A key piece of the Whole Foods story is its unique and dynamic culture.

The culture is one that can adapt, shift, and evolve quickly, while allowing its core values to guide the decision-making process.

The company is very proud of the fact that it is consistently rated one of the best places to work, and views the high morale of its employees as being essential to its success.

Extracted relation(s):

- **Dynamic adaptive culture (Innovation and adaptability) → Unique in-store experience initiatives (Customer satisfaction).**
- **Dynamic adaptive culture (Innovation and adaptability) → High employee morale (Employee satisfaction).**

Explanation: The original segment mentions “unique and dynamic culture.” It does not provide sufficient context to establish specific relationships. The context discussing how “Whole Foods emphasized its unique in-store experience” and detailing various innovations (brewing beer, roasting coffee, cooking studios) enables identification of key patterns: adaptive culture fostering unique store initiatives. Moreover, the wider context noting Whole Foods is “consistently rated one of the best places to work” and views “high morale of its employees as being essential to its success” establishes the link between adaptable culture and employee satisfaction.

*This report was written by Joseph Feldman from Telsey Advisory Group for Whole Foods Market Inc. released on 3/2/2015.*

#### **Example 4.**

Rice Brothers on the Cusp of Depositing EQT's Management Team

EQT reported the results of its AGM, with shareholders electing all of the seven Rice nominees as well as the five nominees supported by the Rice brothers and EQT.

We believe that it is likely that the company will announce later today that Toby Rice will replace Robert McNally as the CEO.

During the past several months, the Rice team has progressively released details of its plan to transform EQT, which were met with rebuttals from the management team of EQT.

Rice had been critical of EQT's high well costs and suggested this resulted in weaker-than-optimal capital efficiencies.

The Rice team highlighted the \$300 million cost over-run in H2/18 as evidence of a lack of capital discipline. The Rice brothers pointed out that the well costs could be significantly brought down by drilling longer laterals, thus decreasing the costs on a per foot basis.

Recently, the Rice brothers had broadened their reform agenda by providing a more detailed plan.

This included a comprehensive 100day plan, which include a plethora of technological initiatives to enhance capital efficiencies.

A key focus of the Rice plan will be to improve the current planning and scheduling of various operations.

A vital area for improvement identified by the Rice team is the optimization of rig mobilization to reduce rig movement while drilling wells by ~75%.

The Terminal Objective of the Rice Plan is to generate an incremental FCF of \$500 million.

■ Our View: The successful execution of the plan by the Rice team remains to be seen.

However, the involvement of the Rice team has certainly put capital discipline and efficiencies under a microscope.

Looking forward, we believe this renewed focus on efficiency, improvement, and FCF is ultimately in the best interest of equity holders.

Practically speaking, in our experience, organizational transitions can take longer to realize than originally anticipated -especially when dealing with a transformation of corporate culture.

We will revisit our rating and target price upon evidence that the proposed plan is resulting in notable improvements.

EQT is the largest natural gas producer in North America, accounting for 4% of North American production. It is primarily focused in the Appalachian Basin.

The company recently (2017) acquired its competitor Rice Energy.

The successful integration of this business has the potential to drive significant operational synergies going forward.

Extracted relation(s):

- **Rice brothers' reform agenda (Business strategy) → Transformational efficiency culture (Performance-oriented culture).**
- **Transformational efficiency culture (Performance-oriented culture) → Improved capital efficiencies (Profitability).**

Explanation: The original segment mentions “transformation of corporate culture” no specific relationships. The broader context revealing the “Rice brothers’ reform agenda” with its “100-day plan” and “technological initiatives to enhance capital efficiencies” enables identification of key patterns: reform agenda driving transformation toward efficiency culture, and this culture leading to improved capital efficiencies. Specifically, the wider context detailing criticism of “high well costs” and plans for “optimization of rig mobilization” establishes the link between cultural transformation and operational improvements.

*This report was written by Aaron Bilkoski from TD Securities for EQT Corporation released on 7/10/2019.*

This table illustrates how retrieval augmented generation (RAG) improves our generative AI model’s analysis of analyst reports. The highlighted segments in each example are the input to our model (without additional context), while the entire passage in each example are the input to the model after applying RAG.

**Table IA6**  
**Examples of the extracted cause or effect relations**

Example 1: Coca-Cola's CEO Neville Isdell presented for the company at the CAGNY conference in Arizona this morning. While there was not much new news in the presentation, the company's tone has changed meaningfully from Isdell's presentation at CAGNY two years ago (when KO was promising the market very little) to today, when the company has greater confidence that its long-term algorithm is both working and sustainable. We highlight what we think were a few of the key takeaways below:

- The company highlighted the improving performance in 2006 as KO has moved through its Manifesto For Growth strategy and now enters a phase of likely sustainable growth with a focus on growing the core brands, capturing emerging platforms by establishing a culture of innovation, and providing franchise leadership to the bottlers (which was consistent with what we heard from CCE yesterday, with a greater focus on increasing collaboration with the bottling system).
- KO is entering 2007 with some of the strongest growth momentum in the last several years, and the company has demonstrated that they can continue to post solid growth despite underperformance in key markets. NA should remain a challenge in 2007, but KO has clearly shown an ability to turn around problem markets and seems very comfortable with its long-term growth model given strength in the balance of the business. While it's not yet clear what stage in the turnaround we have entered for key markets such as Japan, Germany, and India, KO expressed confidence in the recent improvements in these areas and we are encouraged by the results...

Extracted relation(s):

- **Manifesto for growth strategy (Business strategy) → Innovative and growth-oriented culture (Innovation).** Explanation: The culture is shaped by the strategic focus on growth and innovation.
- **Innovative and growth-oriented culture (Innovation) → Sustainable growth (Market share and growth).** Explanation: The culture fosters sustainable growth as indicated by the company's performance.

*Ref: This report was written by John A. Faucher from JP Morgan for Coca-Cola Co. released on 2/22/2007.*

Example 2: Our \$46 Dec-12 Price Target is based on 12.0x our 2013 EPS of \$3.85 (above M's trailing 3-year 10.5x avg, but 230bps below its dept store peer average of 14.3x). Focused on company specific initiatives (My Macy's, Magic Selling, and Direct/Omni-channel) M has separated itself from moderate peers (JCP/KSS) executing on a three-tiered strategy (brands, fashion, price). With the turn in the selling culture taking place just last summer (according to CEO Lundgren) and with gross margin drivers on the horizon (Omnichannel and price optimization) we see double digit earnings growth through 2015.

Extracted relation(s):

- **My Macy's initiative (Business strategy) → Focused selling culture (Customer-oriented).** Explanation: The segment mentions the My Macy's initiative as a specific strategy that has contributed to the focused selling culture.
- **Focused selling culture (Customer-oriented) → Double digit earnings growth through 2015 (Market share and growth).** Explanation: The report indicates that the focused selling culture is expected to result in double digit earnings growth.

*Ref: This report was written by Matthew R. Boss from JP Morgan for Macy's Inc. released on 3/12/2012.*

Example 3: It was championed by Starbucks' chairman Howard Schultz since early in Starbucks' existence. Health care costs have increased dramatically over the past several years, and continue to pressure the company's operating margins. However, we do not expect Starbucks to move away from the health benefit program, as it is an important part of its culture and its ability to attract good employees...

Extracted relation(s):

- **Employee-focused culture (Collaboration and People-oriented) → Ability to attract good employees (Employee satisfaction).** Explanation: A strong focus on employee benefits helps in attracting talent.

*Ref: This report was written by Ashley R. Woodruff from Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. for Starbucks Corporation released on 5/18/2005.*

Example 4: ... XPO has also instilled a strong performance-based culture (salary plus incentive compensation tied to gross margin dollars and gross margin dollars per load), which we believe has contributed to the recent increase in productivity and should help drive revenue growth as the salesforce continues to mature (average tenure is a little over one year). We believe XPO is positioned well to gain market share as it has focused on high customer service while broadening its solution set-something few competitors have been able to achieve successfully. ... XPO has instilled a performance-driven culture focused on delivering high-quality service to all customers, with a goal of zero service failures (overall service levels are currently around 97% for pickup and delivery).

Extracted relation(s):

- **Strong performance-driven culture (Performance-oriented) → Increase in productivity (Market share and growth).** Explanation: The performance-driven culture established by Mr. Jacobs contributes to increased productivity as noted in the report.
- **Strong performance-driven culture (Performance-oriented) → High customer service (Customer satisfaction).** Explanation: The focus on performance drives high customer service levels, as indicated by the company's service goals.

*Ref: This report was written by Nathan Brochmann from William Blair & Company for XPO Inc. released on 6/19/2015.*

Example 5: ... Demand Remains Solid; Raising FVE to \$88 17 Feb 2017. Arista reported strong results in its fourth quarter, with revenue increasing above our expectations. We are impressed by another year of stellar revenue growth, as the company's strategic focus on large customers' needs and its culture of product innovation are paying off. ...

Extracted relation(s):

- **Innovative product culture (Innovation and Adaptability) → Stellar revenue growth (Market share and growth).** Explanation: The focus on product innovation is directly associated with stellar revenue growth.

*Ref: This report was written by Ilya Kundozerov from Morningstar Inc. for Arista Networks Inc. released on 5/8/2017.*

This table provides examples of the extracted cause or effect relations in analyst reports by our generative AI model. In each example, a snippet of the culture-related segment is provided, the extracted terms with corresponding canonicalized terms are in parentheses, the cause or effect relations are highlighted in boldface, and generative AI's explanation for such extraction is provided.

**Table IA7**  
**Analysts' culture analyses and firm performance**

Variable	ROA_1yr	ROA_1yr	ROA_3yr	ROA_3yr	Sales growth_1yr	Sales growth_1yr	Sales growth_3yr	Sales growth_3yr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Tone	0.008*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.017*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.019*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
Call tone	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	0.018*** (0.005)	0.017*** (0.005)	-0.005 (0.006)	-0.006 (0.006)
Glassdoor tone	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)	0.007 (0.005)
Non-culture tone		0.034*** (0.004)		0.029*** (0.005)		0.097*** (0.012)		0.053*** (0.012)
Controls	YES							
Industry FE	YES							
Year FE	YES							
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.423	0.429	0.254	0.258	0.164	0.172	0.087	0.090
Observations	8,908	8,908	6,699	6,699	8,908	8,908	6,699	6,699

This table presents the horse race of culture tones extracted from the three different corpora in predicting future firm performance. *ROA\_1yr* and *ROA\_3yr* are one year and three years out ROA measures. *Sales growth\_1yr* and *Sales growth\_3yr* are defined analogously. *Tone* is the average tone of culture-related segments in analyst reports in a year. *Call tone* is the average tone of culture-related segments in earnings calls in a year. *Glassdoor tone* is the average tone of culture-related Glassdoor reviews in a year. *Non-culture tone* is the average tone of non-culture-related segments in analyst reports in a year. The control variables include lagged firm size, firm age, sales growth, ROA, leverage, tangibility, ROA volatility, large institutional ownership, and loss year, and are not reported for brevity. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* correspond to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table IA8**  
**Summary statistics**

Panel A: Summary statistics for Table 6 Panel A

	Observations	Mean	P25	Median	P75	STD
Culture discussion	24,250	0.563	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.496
Total assets	24,250	12516.700	749.830	2356.565	8275.834	33757.550
Firm age	24,250	26.951	13.000	22.000	40.000	17.655
Sales growth	24,250	0.098	-0.006	0.071	0.168	0.222
ROA	24,250	0.038	0.012	0.043	0.082	0.094
Leverage	24,250	0.235	0.067	0.213	0.354	0.196
Tangibility	24,250	0.239	0.053	0.149	0.362	0.238
ROA volatility	24,250	0.040	0.008	0.018	0.043	0.062
Large institutional ownership	24,250	0.387	0.127	0.373	0.599	0.293
Board independence	24,250	0.722	0.615	0.700	0.857	0.134
CEO duality	24,250	0.479	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.500
Number of key people changes	24,250	3.646	1.000	3.000	5.000	3.622
Number of M&As	24,250	0.709	0.000	0.000	1.000	1.224
Strong culture	24,250	0.194	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.395
Number of meetings	24,250	1.163	0.000	0.000	1.000	2.294
Employee culture rating	9,371	2.205	0.000	2.700	3.250	1.444
Number of employee reviews	9,371	85.069	4.000	18.000	66.000	203.381

Panel B: Summary statistics for Table 6 Panel C

	Observations	Mean	P25	Median	P75	STD
Culture discussion	160,322	0.168	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.374
Number of types	26,911	1.292	1.000	1.000	1.000	0.604
Number of causes	26,911	0.439	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.538
Number of effects	26,911	1.005	0.000	1.000	2.000	0.860
Tone	26,911	0.510	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.629
Star analyst	160,322	0.074	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.262
CFA	160,322	0.481	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.714
Postgraduate	160,322	0.619	0.000	1.000	1.000	0.660
Female	160,322	0.103	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.304
General experience	160,322	11.141	6.000	10.000	16.000	7.022
Firm experience	160,322	5.532	2.000	4.000	8.000	4.438
Number of industries followed	160,322	4.624	3.000	4.000	6.000	2.627
Number of firms followed	160,322	19.134	14.000	18.000	24.000	8.412
Forecast frequency	160,322	4.572	3.000	4.000	6.000	2.520
Broker size	160,322	64.430	26.000	57.000	103.000	42.506
Local analyst	160,322	0.136	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.342

Panel C: Summary statistics for Table 7 Panel A (Analyst-Executive)

	Observations	Mean	P25	Median	P75	STD
Type divergence	12,409	0.583	0.374	0.548	0.729	0.282
Cause divergence	12,409	0.696	0.500	0.693	0.990	0.332
Effect divergence	12,409	0.550	0.377	0.514	0.707	0.262
Total assets	12,409	21515.130	1531.932	4867.831	16575.870	48978.390
Firm age	12,409	28.825	15.000	23.000	43.000	17.952
Sales growth	12,409	0.096	0.004	0.071	0.158	0.195
ROA	12,409	0.050	0.014	0.049	0.089	0.080
Leverage	12,409	0.237	0.083	0.216	0.350	0.188
Tangibility	12,409	0.220	0.049	0.134	0.321	0.225
ROA volatility	12,409	0.032	0.007	0.016	0.034	0.049
Large institutional ownership	12,409	0.387	0.143	0.376	0.585	0.284

Board independence	12,409	0.118	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.323
Loss year	12,409	0.719	0.615	0.688	0.857	0.128
CEO duality	12,409	0.476	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.499
CEO tenure	12,409	7.765	2.748	5.751	10.599	6.903
CEO Delta	12,409	865.020	106.225	292.279	760.871	1863.891
CEO Vega	12,409	166.907	8.757	64.821	207.845	252.750
CEO close-to-retire	12,409	0.208	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.406
Number of meetings	12,409	1.599	0.000	0.000	2.000	2.669

Panel D: Summary statistics for Table 7 Panel A (Analyst-Employee)

	Observations	Mean	P25	Median	P75	STD
Type divergence	9,564	0.678	0.527	0.641	0.793	0.222
Cause divergence	9,564	0.653	0.483	0.646	0.913	0.315
Effect divergence	9,564	0.678	0.522	0.671	0.833	0.261
Total assets	9,564	21978.610	16111.109	5174.849	17207.700	49169.500
Firm age	9,564	29.697	16.000	24.000	44.000	18.238
Sales growth	9,564	0.079	-0.008	0.058	0.138	0.192
ROA	9,564	0.047	0.013	0.046	0.087	0.082
Leverage	9,564	0.245	0.090	0.225	0.360	0.191
Tangibility	9,564	0.217	0.048	0.129	0.316	0.227
ROA volatility	9,564	0.032	0.007	0.016	0.035	0.049
Large institutional ownership	9,564	0.418	0.211	0.410	0.612	0.280
Board independence	9,564	0.129	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.335
Loss year	9,564	0.745	0.643	0.722	0.875	0.125
CEO duality	9,564	0.439	0.000	0.000	1.000	0.496
CEO tenure	9,564	7.869	2.821	5.914	10.844	6.901
CEO Delta	9,564	799.530	95.177	262.698	699.157	1793.881
CEO Vega	9,564	154.986	2.938	54.653	195.047	242.989
CEO close-to-retire	9,564	0.206	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.404
Number of meetings	9,564	2.074	0.000	1.000	3.000	2.873

This table presents the summary statistics for samples used in different regression analyses. In Panel A, our firm-year sample consists of 24,250 firm-year observations, representing 2,318 unique firms over the period 2002-2020. In Panel B, our firm-analyst-year sample consists of 160,332 firm-analyst-year observations, representing 2,471 unique firms followed by 4,096 analysts. In Panel C, our analyst-executive firm-year sample consists of 12,409 firm-year observations, representing 2,064 unique firms over the period 2004-2020. In Panel D, our analyst-employee firm-year sample consists of 9,564 firm-year observations, representing 1,805 unique firms over the period 2008-2020.

**Table IA9**  
**Correlation matrices for the firm-year and firm-analyst-year samples**

Panel A: Correlation matrix for Table 6 Panel A

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Culture discussion	1															
Firm size	0.293***	1														
Firm age	0.056***	0.377***	1													
Sales growth	0.008	-0.083***	-0.197***	1												
ROA	0.125***	0.051***	0.062***	0.155***	1											
Leverage	-0.003	0.251***	0.115***	-0.051***	-0.136***	1										
Tangibility	-0.075***	0.074***	0.183***	-0.044***	0.007	0.267***	1									
ROA volatility	-0.133***	-0.315***	-0.160***	0.020***	-0.411***	-0.014**	-0.031***	1								
Large institutional ownership	-0.041***	-0.152***	-0.005	-0.066***	-0.009	0.009	-0.066***	-0.010*	1							
Board independence	-0.076***	-0.103***	0.070***	-0.028***	-0.095***	0.034***	-0.033***	0.007	0.223***	1						
CEO duality	0.035***	0.128***	0.066***	0.013**	0.063***	0.016***	0.061***	-0.090***	-0.085***	-0.159***	1					
Number of key people changes	0.164***	0.273***	0.154***	-0.080***	-0.069***	0.042***	-0.046***	0.004	0.010*	0.064***	-0.067***	1				
Number of M&As	0.139***	0.314***	0.062***	0.053***	0.003	0.082***	-0.035***	-0.049***	-0.152***	-0.148***	0.068***	0.125***	1			
Strong culture	0.071***	-0.178***	-0.183***	0.051***	-0.041***	-0.121***	-0.167***	0.105***	0.009	0.003	-0.047***	0.068***	-0.008	1		
Number of meetings	0.164***	0.269***	0.134***	-0.034***	0.050***	0.131***	-0.039***	-0.037***	0.170***	0.160***	-0.086***	0.141***	0.043***	0.056***	1	
Employee culture rating	0.070***	0.056***	0.059***	-0.006	0.006	0.105***	0.004	-0.056***	0.203***	0.135***	-0.087***	-0.006	-0.020*	0.039***	0.342***	1
Number of employee reviews	0.320***	0.462***	0.156***	-0.067***	0.108***	0.114***	-0.048***	-0.152***	0.018*	-0.193***	-0.003	0.259***	0.198***	0.128***	0.426***	0.454***

Panel B: Correlation matrix for Table 6 Panel C

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Culture discussion	1										
Star analyst	0.017***	1									
CFA	0.027***	0.020***	1								
Postgraduate	-0.012***	0.005**	-0.066***	1							
Female	0.028***	-0.029***	-0.026***	-0.058***	1						
General experience	0.025***	0.109***	0.049***	0.077***	-0.040***	1					
Firm experience	0.024***	0.110***	0.016***	0.033***	-0.038***	0.599***	1				
Number of industries followed	0.022***	0.042***	0.069***	0.023***	-0.019***	0.156***	0.073***	1			
Number of firms followed	-0.017***	0.118***	0.066***	0.080***	-0.066***	0.290***	0.169***	0.389***	1		
Forecast frequency	0.029***	0.117***	0.036***	0.012***	0.011***	0.048***	0.132***	-0.034***	0.111***	1	
Ln(Broker size)	0.044***	0.222***	0.025***	-0.080***	0.031***	-0.034***	0.010***	-0.075***	0.082***	0.112***	1
Local analyst	0.009***	0.023***	-0.010***	0.014***	0.006**	0.017***	0.022***	0.007***	0.006**	0.000	-0.006**

Panel C: Correlation matrix for Table 7 Panel A (Analyst-Executive)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Type divergence	1																	
Cause divergence	0.055***	1																
Effect divergence	0.319***	0.405***	1															
Firm size	-0.178***	-0.027***	-0.104***	1														
Ln(Firm age + 1)	-0.071***	-0.004	-0.052***	0.372***	1													
Sales growth	0.059***	-0.039***	0.019**	-0.084***	-0.190***	1												
ROA	-0.042***	-0.030***	-0.036***	0.068***	0.065***	0.159***	1											
Leverage	-0.041***	-0.007	-0.027***	0.249***	0.104***	-0.052***	-0.138***	1										
Tangibility	0.051***	-0.018**	0.043***	0.083***	0.185***	-0.049***	0.000	0.269***	1									
ROA volatility	0.079***	0.037***	0.066***	-0.320***	-0.157***	0.023***	-0.406***	-0.009	-0.027***	1								
Large institutional ownership	-0.026***	0.041***	0.004	-0.137***	-0.014**	-0.064***	-0.007	0.007	-0.070***	-0.016***	1							
Board independence	-0.010	0.075***	0.026***	-0.126***	0.037***	-0.021***	-0.101***	0.024***	-0.034***	0.015**	0.207***	1						
Loss year	0.037***	0.030***	0.033***	-0.179***	-0.097***	-0.145***	-0.672***	0.102***	0.027***	0.412***	0.027***	0.051***	1					
CEO duality	0.026***	-0.026***	0.011	0.121***	0.070***	0.016***	0.063***	0.010*	0.060***	-0.089***	-0.072***	-0.150***	-0.089***	1				
CEO tenure	0.049***	0.002	0.071***	-0.075***	-0.036***	0.038***	0.046***	-0.084***	-0.047***	-0.046***	0.018***	-0.059***	-0.048***	0.331***	1			
CEO Delta	-0.072***	-0.045***	-0.040***	0.340***	0.042***	0.120***	0.289***	0.001	-0.049***	-0.175***	-0.102***	-0.255***	-0.253***	0.302***	0.374***	1		
CEO Vega	-0.061***	-0.053***	-0.057***	0.236***	0.083***	0.008	0.107***	0.008	-0.054***	-0.050***	-0.091***	-0.223***	-0.088***	0.160***	-0.002	0.501***	1	
CEO close-to-retire	0.026***	-0.035***	0.020**	-0.061***	-0.054***	0.032***	-0.010	-0.025***	-0.003	0.007	-0.052***	-0.065***	-0.009	0.151***	0.360***	0.127***	-0.021***	1
Ln(Number of meetings + 1)	-0.195***	0.009	-0.106***	0.303***	0.131***	-0.032***	0.054***	0.137***	-0.039***	-0.043***	0.147***	0.130***	-0.041***	-0.069***	-0.015**	0.176***	0.040***	-0.059***

Panel D: Correlation matrix for Table 7 Panel A (Analyst-Employee)

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18
Type divergence	1																	
Cause divergence	0.003	1																
Effect divergence	0.086***	0.505***	1															
Firm size	-0.207***	-0.082***	-0.064***	1														
Ln(Firm age + 1)	-0.015	0.01	0.042***	0.366***	1													
Sales growth	-0.003	-0.005	0.009	-0.089***	-0.180***	1												
ROA	-0.053***	0.038***	0.046***	0.083***	0.076***	0.157***	1											
Leverage	0.003	-0.002	0.028***	0.252***	0.096***	-0.046***	-0.121***	1										
Tangibility	0.076***	0.019*	0.035***	0.095***	0.189***	-0.047***	-0.003	0.273***	1									
ROA volatility	0.095***	0.012	0.015	-0.324***	-0.161***	0.028***	-0.420***	-0.009	-0.026***	1								
Large institutional ownership	0.026***	0.036***	0.063***	-0.119***	-0.013**	-0.054***	0.003	0.002	-0.083***	-0.031***	1							
Board independence	0.122***	0.053***	0.021**	-0.141***	0.022***	-0.002	-0.077***	0.006	-0.043***	0.006	0.210***	1						
Loss year	0.043***	-0.022**	-0.029***	-0.185***	-0.106***	-0.142***	-0.676***	0.094***	0.026***	0.414***	0.018***	0.034***	1					

CEO duality	-0.026***	-0.007	0.004	0.115***	0.066***	0.009	0.061***	0.006	0.060***	-0.083***	-0.068***	-0.149***	-0.086***	1				
CEO tenure	-0.020**	0.005	0.032***	-0.076***	-0.032***	0.040***	0.049***	-0.094***	-0.052***	-0.047***	0.012*	-0.058***	-0.050***	0.338***	1			
CEO Delta	-0.153***	-0.007	0.047***	0.323***	0.040***	0.107***	0.289***	0.013*	-0.051***	-0.172***	-0.075***	-0.241***	-0.251***	0.298***	0.383***	1		
CEO Vega	-0.084***	0.004	0.018*	0.200***	0.072***	-0.002	0.100***	0.013*	-0.055***	-0.034***	-0.070***	-0.209***	-0.076***	0.153***	0.007	0.485***	1	
CEO close-to-retire	-0.018*	-0.016*	0.006	-0.048***	-0.040***	0.028***	-0.011*	-0.025***	-0.001	0.009	-0.050***	-0.063***	-0.009	0.163***	0.364***	0.134***	-0.016**	1
Ln(Number of meetings + 1)	-0.145***	-0.037***	0	0.348***	0.130***	-0.01	0.078***	0.134***	-0.049***	-0.061***	0.129***	0.084***	-0.063***	-0.055***	-0.024***	0.236***	0.087***	-0.056***

This table presents the correlation matrices for samples used in different regression analyses. In Panel A, our firm-year sample consists of 24,250 firm-year observations, representing 2,318 unique firms over the period 2002-2020. In Panel B, our firm-analyst-year sample consists of 160,332 firm-analyst-year observations, representing 2,471 unique firms followed by 4,096 analysts. In Panel C, our analyst-executive firm-year sample consists of 12,409 firm-year observations, representing 2,064 unique firms over the period 2004-2020. In Panel D, our analyst-employee firm-year sample consists of 9,564 firm-year observations, representing 1,805 unique firms over the period 2008-2020. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* correspond to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table IA10**  
**Explaining the divergence among analysts of their perspectives on corporate culture**

Panel A: Firm characteristics and divergences in perspectives among analysts

Variable	Analyst-Analyst			
	Type divergence	Cause divergence	Effect divergence	Tone divergence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Firm size	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.011*** (0.002)	0.017*** (0.004)
Ln(Firm age + 1)	0.004 (0.006)	0.007 (0.006)	0.010* (0.005)	-0.006 (0.008)
Sales growth	0.012 (0.017)	-0.038** (0.018)	0.024* (0.013)	-0.020 (0.020)
ROA	0.029 (0.054)	-0.066 (0.066)	-0.117*** (0.045)	0.035 (0.076)
Leverage	0.021 (0.019)	-0.032 (0.021)	-0.010 (0.016)	0.028 (0.025)
Tangibility	0.021 (0.020)	-0.035 (0.023)	-0.021 (0.018)	0.031 (0.026)
ROA volatility	0.126 (0.078)	0.013 (0.086)	-0.050 (0.069)	0.408*** (0.101)
Large institutional ownership	0.015 (0.013)	0.020 (0.015)	0.020* (0.011)	-0.001 (0.016)
Board independence	0.018 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.014)	0.007 (0.011)	0.057*** (0.015)
Loss year	0.030 (0.031)	0.026 (0.036)	0.031 (0.026)	-0.025 (0.040)
CEO duality	-0.004 (0.007)	0.005 (0.007)	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.010 (0.009)
CEO tenure	0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
CEO Delta	-0.003 (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.004)
CEO Vega	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
CEO close-to-retire	0.017** (0.008)	-0.014* (0.009)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.023** (0.010)
Ln(Number of meetings + 1)	-0.008 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.004 (0.005)	-0.015* (0.008)
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R-squared	0.006	0.005	0.012	0.016
Observations	13,023	13,023	13,023	13,023

Panel B: Analyst characteristics and divergences in perspectives among analysts

Variable	Analyst-Analyst			
	Type divergence	Cause divergence	Effect divergence	Tone divergence
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Star analyst	-0.003 (0.008)	0.000 (0.009)	-0.000 (0.008)	0.003 (0.010)
CFA	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Postgraduate	-0.001	-0.001	-0.003	-0.011**

	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Female	-0.005 (0.006)	0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.007)	0.002 (0.009)
General experience	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.001)
Firm experience	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Number of industries followed	-0.001 (0.001)	0.004** (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.002)
Number of firms followed	0.001 (0.000)	-0.001*** (0.000)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)
Forecast frequency	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Ln(Broker size)	-0.016 (0.012)	0.007 (0.013)	0.007 (0.012)	-0.000 (0.016)
Local analyst	0.008 (0.008)	0.012 (0.008)	0.006 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.009)
Firm × Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Broker FE	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.185	0.216	0.142	0.278
No. of observations	19,741	19,741	19,741	19,741

Panel C: Analyst characteristics and divergences in perspectives among analysts regarding a specific culture type or in tones

Variable	Analyst-Analyst Difference								
	Collaboration and People-focused	Customer -oriented	Innovation and adaptability	Integrity and risk management	Performance -oriented	Misc.	Cause	Effect	Tone
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Star analyst	0.011 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.009)	0.007 (0.016)	-0.009 (0.010)	-0.003 (0.015)	0.003 (0.009)	-0.021 (0.020)	-0.022 (0.033)	-0.021 (0.023)
CFA	-0.002 (0.006)	0.006* (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.002 (0.006)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.009)
Postgraduate	-0.001 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.013* (0.007)	0.000 (0.004)	0.013* (0.007)	0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.008)	0.013 (0.014)	0.006 (0.010)
Female	0.038*** (0.012)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.015 (0.013)	-0.012* (0.006)	0.009 (0.015)	-0.012 (0.026)	0.027 (0.019)
General experience	-0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001** (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)
Firm experience	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Number of industries followed	-0.004* (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.007** (0.003)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.004 (0.003)	0.000 (0.006)	0.010*** (0.004)
Number of firms followed	0.001** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.000)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.003* (0.002)	-0.002* (0.001)
Forecast frequency	0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.004)	0.000 (0.003)
Ln(Broker size)	0.005 (0.021)	0.001 (0.014)	0.001 (0.021)	0.007 (0.012)	0.012 (0.022)	-0.020 (0.013)	0.011 (0.029)	0.044 (0.049)	0.036 (0.033)
Local analyst	0.014 (0.014)	0.020** (0.009)	-0.031** (0.015)	0.015 (0.011)	-0.024 (0.015)	0.003 (0.008)	0.033* (0.019)	-0.011 (0.031)	0.005 (0.024)
Firm × Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Broker FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.020	0.022	0.025	0.075	0.032	0.019	0.019	0.025	0.088
No. of observations	20,150	20,150	20,150	20,150	20,150	20,150	20,150	20,150	20,150

This table examines the determinants of the divergence among analysts of their perspectives on corporate culture. Panel A examines the relationships between firm characteristics and divergences among analysts about culture types (their causes, effects, or tones). Our firm-year sample consists of 13,023 firm-year observations, representing 1,920 unique firms over the period 2000-2020. The dependent variable, *Type divergence*, is the firm-year average of each individual analyst following a focal firm, her number of culture types mentioned minus the average of other fellow analysts' number of culture types mentioned in their reports. Other divergence measures are defined analogously. Panel B examines the relationships between analyst characteristics and divergences among analysts about culture types (their causes, effects, or tones). Our firm-analyst-year

sample consists of 25,383 firm-analyst-year observations, representing 1,858 unique firms and 2,591 unique analysts over the period 2000-2020 (a smaller sample in regressions due to fixed effects). The dependent variable, *Type divergence*, for each individual analyst following a focal firm, is her number of culture types mentioned minus the average of other fellow analysts' number of culture types mentioned in their reports. Other divergence measures are defined analogously. Panel C examines the relationships between analyst characteristics and differences among analysts regarding a specific culture type (tones used when discussing culture). The dependent variable, *Collaboration and people-focused*, for each individual analyst following a focal firm, is her number of times discussing this culture type minus the average number of times other fellow analysts discuss the same culture type. Other divergence measures are defined analogously. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* correspond to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table IA11****Divergence in different stakeholder groups' perspectives on culture and future firm performance**

Panel A: Divergence in tones between analysts and executives in discussing culture and future firm performance

Variable	ROA_1yr	ROA_1yr	ROA_3yr	ROA_3yr	Sales growth_1yr	Sales growth_1yr	Sales growth_3yr	Sales growth_3yr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Tone	0.012*** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.007** (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.034*** (0.007)	0.019*** (0.007)	0.029*** (0.007)	0.022*** (0.007)
Tone × Analyst-executive tone divergence	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.004)	-0.021** (0.010)	-0.019* (0.010)	-0.015 (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)
Analyst-executive tone divergence	0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.000 (0.004)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.007 (0.008)	0.005 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)
Non-culture tone		0.041*** (0.003)		0.041*** (0.005)		0.109*** (0.010)		0.048*** (0.010)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.424	0.432	0.218	0.226	0.175	0.185	0.112	0.114
Observations	12,028	12,028	9,501	9,501	12,028	12,028	9,501	9,501

Panel B: Divergence in tones between analysts and employees in discussing culture and future firm performance

Variable	ROA_1yr	ROA_1yr	ROA_3yr	ROA_3yr	Sales growth_1yr	Sales growth_1yr	Sales growth_3yr	Sales growth_3yr
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Tone	0.012*** (0.004)	0.008* (0.004)	0.010** (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.030*** (0.011)	0.017 (0.010)	0.020** (0.010)	0.013 (0.010)
Tone $\times$ Analyst-employee tone divergence	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.003 (0.006)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.016 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)	-0.000 (0.013)
Analyst-employee tone divergence	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.009* (0.005)	-0.010** (0.005)	0.006 (0.012)	0.004 (0.012)	-0.008 (0.011)	-0.010 (0.011)
Non-culture tone		0.034*** (0.004)		0.030*** (0.005)		0.098*** (0.012)		0.053*** (0.012)
Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Year FE	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.422	0.428	0.254	0.259	0.163	0.171	0.087	0.090
Observations	8,908	8,908	6,699	6,699	8,908	8,908	6,699	6,699

This table examines the relationship between the divergence in different stakeholder groups' perspectives on culture and future firm performance. Panel A examines the relationship between the divergence in tones between analysts and executives in discussing culture and future firm performance. Panel B examines the relationship between the divergence in tones between analysts and employees in discussing culture and future firm performance. *ROA\_1yr* and *ROA\_3yr* are one year and three years out ROA measures. *Sales growth\_1yr* and *Sales growth\_3yr* are defined analogously. *Tone* is the average tone of culture-related segments in analyst reports in a year. *Analyst-executive tone divergence* is the Euclidean distance between a three-element vector capturing tones in reports and another three-element vector capturing tones in calls. *Analyst-employee tone divergence* is defined analogously. *Non-culture tone* is the average tone of non-culture-related segments in analyst reports in a year. Control variables include lagged firm size, firm age, sales growth, ROA, leverage, tangibility, ROA volatility, large institutional ownership, and loss year, and are not reported for brevity. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* correspond to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.

**Table IA12**  
**Horse race among GPT tone, FinBERT tone, and LM tone**

Variable	Recommendation	Target price	CAR[-1,+1]
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Tone	0.108*** (0.011)	0.022*** (0.003)	0.169** (0.074)
FinBERT tone	0.034*** (0.009)	0.004* (0.002)	0.145** (0.062)
LM tone	0.007 (0.008)	0.001 (0.002)	0.035 (0.059)
Controls	YES	YES	YES
Firm $\times$ Year FE	YES	YES	No
Analyst FE	YES	YES	No
Industry FE	No	No	YES
Year FE	No	No	YES
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.458	0.422	0.050
No. of observations	28,903	29,169	14,592

This table compares the information content of analyst culture discussion using three different approaches to construct tone: GPT (*Tone*), FinBERT (*FinBERT tone*), and bag of words (*LM tone*). The dependent variables are analyst recommendation, target price, and three-day abnormal returns around analyst report release. Control variables are the same as those in Tables 8 and 9. Industry fixed effects are based on Fama-French 12-industry classifications. Definitions of the variables are provided in the Appendix. Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. \*\*\*, \*\*, \* correspond to statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.